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INTRODUCTION
Using a committee consisting of a business debtor‘s largest
creditors to facilitate a financial restructuring agreement between the
debtor and its creditors is not a new concept. In the early 1900s,
equity receiverships performed a similar function, and creditors‘
committees were subsequently incorporated into the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.1 Although the committee structure holds the promise of
representation and cooperation, creditors‘ committees are, and to some
extent always have been, vulnerable to manipulation, conflict, and
self-interest.2 Anecdotal evidence suggests that these abuses are on
the rise. Consider the following:
FiberMark, Inc., a producer of specialty fiber-based materials,
filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case on March 30, 2004, with
approximately $185 million in assets and $359 million in liabilities.3
The vast majority of FiberMark‘s liabilities were concentrated in two
public bond issuances aggregating approximately $346 million.4 Those
bonds in turn were heavily traded in the secondary market both
immediately before and during FiberMark‘s Chapter 11 case.5
The U.S. trustee initially appointed two of FiberMark‘s
bondholders—AIG Global Investment Corp. and Post Advisory Group
LLC—and the indenture trustee of those bond issuances to
FiberMark‘s five-member creditors‘ committee.6 AIG and Post
collectively owned thirty-four percent of FiberMark‘s bond debt, with
Post acquiring its fifteen percent holdings during the first quarter of
2004.7 The original committee also included two of FiberMark‘s trade
creditors—E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company and Solution
Dispersions, Inc.8
1.
See infra Part II.A.
2.
For an overview of the committee structure under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
see Kenneth N. Klee & K. John Shaffer, Creditors’ Committees Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 44 S.C. L. REV. 995 (1993).
3.
Schedules of Assets & Liabilities & Schedule of Executory Contracts & Unexpired
Leases, In re FiberMark, Inc., No. 04–10463 (Bankr. D. Vt. May 14, 2004).
4.
Id. sched. F.
5.
Report of Harvey R. Miller, as Examiner at 4–5, 8, FiberMark, No. 04–10463 (Aug. 16,
2005) [hereinafter Miller Report] (describing activity in secondary bond market). Buying and
trading in the debt of financially distressed companies like FiberMark is a common investment
strategy. See generally Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy
Implications of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703 (2008) (describing the
activities of distressed debt investors).
6.
Appointment of Committee of Unsecured Creditors, FiberMark, No. 04–10463 (Apr. 7,
2004) [hereinafter Committee Appointment].
7.
Miller Report, supra note 5, at 4.
8.
Committee Appointment, supra note 6.
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Shortly after the appointment of the committee, FiberMark
and DuPont reached an agreement that allowed DuPont to set off and
thereby satisfy a large portion of its claim against FiberMark.9 The
court approved that agreement on June 14, 2004,10 and DuPont
resigned from the committee on June 24, 2004.11 The U.S. trustee
ultimately appointed Silver Point Capital, LP to fill DuPont‘s seat on
the committee.12 Silver Point acquired over thirty-five percent of
FiberMark‘s bond debt on the secondary market.13
FiberMark proposed a plan of reorganization that
contemplated an exchange of its unsecured debt for a combination of
new debt and the equity of the reorganized company.14 Consequently,
AIG, Post, and Silver Point, as FiberMark‘s largest unsecured
creditors, stood to become the largest shareholders of reorganized
FiberMark. AIG and Post then engaged in a control contest against
Silver Point.15 This disagreement regarding who would control the
reorganized company completely stalled FiberMark‘s reorganization
efforts and cost its creditors an estimated $60 million.16
Given the contentious impasse, the court appointed an
examiner to investigate, among other things, ―the dispute among
Committee members regarding corporate governance issues and
whether any Committee member breached its fiduciary duty to act in
the best interest of all creditors.‖17 The examiner concluded that AIG
9.
Joint Motion of Debtors & E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. for Entry of Order
Permitting Setoff of Mutual Obligations, FiberMark, No. 04–10463 (May 21, 2004).
10. Order Permitting E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. to Setoff Obligations Owing to &
From Debtors, FiberMark, No. 04–10463 (June 14, 2004).
11. Second Amended Appointment of Committee of Unsecured Creditors, FiberMark, No.
04–10463 (June 24, 2004); see also Miller Report, supra note 5, at 28 (―On June 24, 2004,
DuPont, after its claim was satisfied, resigned as a member of the Committee.‖).
12. Third Amended Appointment of Committee of Unsecured Creditors, FiberMark, No.
04–10463 (Oct. 27, 2004).
13. See Miller Report, supra note 5, at 8 (―The increase in Silver Point‘s position was
viewed by Mr. Musante as ‗a tad convenient.‘ ‖).
14. See First Proposed Disclosure Statement with Respect to Joint Plan of Reorganization
Under Chapter 11, Title 11, United States Code of Fibermark, Inc., et al., Debtors, FiberMark,
No. 04–10463 (Nov. 12, 2004).
15. See FiberMark, No. 04–10463, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 652, at *4–6 (Bankr. D. Vt. Apr. 13,
2005) (describing dispute among creditors‘ committee members regarding alleged breaches of
fiduciary duties and claims trading order); Miller Report, supra note 5, at 2–12.
16. Miller Report, supra note 5, at 12.
17. Order Directing the Appointment of an Examiner & Specifying Examiner‘s Duties
Pursuant to § 1004(c) & § 1106(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, FiberMark, No. 04–10463 (Apr. 19,
2005). Section 1104(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
If the court does not order the appointment of a trustee under this section, then at any
time before the confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United
States trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment
of an examiner to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate . . . .
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and Post both breached their fiduciary duties.18 Specifically, the
examiner found that ―AIG breached its fiduciary duties by using the
Committee as a tool to accomplish its own agenda and seek benefits
for itself, particularly in connection with the corporate governance
issues and the pursuit of trading allegations against Silver Point.‖19
He reached a similar conclusion with respect to Post.20
In addition to faulting AIG and Post, the examiner also
reprimanded counsel to the committee, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer,
& Feld, LLP.21 The examiner opined that
Akin failed to discharge its obligations and perform its services in an independent,
objective and disinterested manner as attorneys for the Committee by aligning itself
with AIG and Post, particularly in respect of the corporate governance controversy and
the assertion of Trading Order violations and breaches of fiduciary duties by Silver
Point.22

The ultimate settlement gave Silver Point control of the
reorganized company,23 and, in a separate settlement, Akin agreed to
forego $1.7 million in fees and expenses.24
The FiberMark case illustrates several potential abuses of the
committee structure. Key creditors can use their committee
membership to access information regarding the debtor‘s
reorganization, obtain a seat at the plan negotiation table, and urge
parties to pursue a reorganization that is beneficial to their own
agendas. For instance, AIG allegedly sought to capture control of the
committee and committee counsel for its own purposes. Moreover,
even DuPont‘s service on the committee appears somewhat self11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006).
18. See Miller Report, supra note 5, at 20–24 (setting forth the Examiner‘s conclusions).
19. Id. at 22.
20. Id. at 23 (―Post, in a similar fashion to AIG, acted in its own self interest in pursuing
the imposition of corporate governance provisions on Silver Point and trading allegations against
Silver Point, without consideration of the interests of all general unsecured creditors.‖).
21. See id. at 24 (describing Akin‘s failures).
22. Id.
23. Fourth Proposed Disclosure Statement with Respect to Amended Joint Plan of
Reorganization Under Chapter 11, Title 11, United States Code of FiberMark, Inc., et al.,
Debtors at 52–54, FiberMark, No. 04–10463 (Sept. 23, 2005). AIG and Post agreed to contribute
to a settlement fund and to sell their claims to Silver Point at a significant discount. Id.; see also
Peter Lattman, Bankrupt, FORBES, Oct. 31, 2005, at 60, 60–62, available at http://www.forbes
.com/forbes/2005/1031/060.html (describing Chapter 11 examiner‘s criticism of committee
counsel‘s role in creditors‘ disputes in the FiberMark case).
24. Order Granting Motion to Approve Compromise & Settlement, Granting in Part,
Denying in Part Application for Compensation for Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP,
FiberMark, No. 04–10463 (Mar. 10, 2006). Akin originally requested $4,603,988.75 in fees and
$443,754.24 in expenses for its services during the Chapter 11 case. Final Application for
Compensation for Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP at 2, FiberMark, No. 04–10463 (Sept.
9, 2005).
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motivated, as it resigned from the committee immediately upon
accomplishing its own objective. This type of turnover of committee
membership can cause instability and potentially expose the
committee to further manipulation by other creditors.25
Anecdotal evidence suggests that FiberMark is not an isolated
26
case. Nevertheless, no prior empirical studies evaluate the conduct,
activities, or abuses of creditors‘ committees in Chapter 11 cases.27
The study in this Article fills that void and provides valuable insight
into the role of creditors‘ committees in Chapter 11 cases.
Part I of this Article sets forth the primary findings of the
study. Part II then provides the background for the study by
explaining the historical development of creditors‘ committees and
their contemplated role in the business reorganization process. This
part also summarizes the prior studies concerning Chapter 11 cases
that touch aspects of the committee structure. Part III describes the
methodology underlying the study, and Part IV presents the data. The
study suggests that, in certain cases, creditors‘ committees can add
value to the reorganization process, but it also highlights several
weaknesses in the committee structure that can impair or reallocate
value. Part V explores these issues and offers suggestions for policy
changes and further study.
I. SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
A creditors‘ committee is designed to protect and promote the
interests of general unsecured creditors.28 Since 1978, the U.S. trustee
has appointed creditors‘ committees in some but not all Chapter 11
cases, and the participants largely have assumed the prudence and

25. See infra Part V.
26. Many cases are discussed infra Part II.B. See also Westmoreland Human
Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 327 B.R. 561, 568–76 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (allegations of breach of duty
based on committee member‘s conflicts of interest); In re Venturelink Holdings, Inc., 299 B.R.
420, 422 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (former insider of debtor wanted and initially received
appointment to creditors‘ committee); In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 265 B.R. 427,
429–30 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001) (committee opposed appointment of additional member who held
large claim against debtor and interests that conflicted with other unsecured creditors); In re
Papercraft Corp., 129 B.R. 56, 56–58 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (committee brought litigation
against one of its members who secretly purchased claims worth millions of dollars against the
debtor at a significant discount to the detriment of the debtor and its stakeholders); Complaint at
9–11, 13–14, In re Galey & Lord, No. 02–40445 (AJG) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2003) (alleged breach of
duty by committee member for using confidential information to advance its own interests).
27. See infra Part II.C.
28. See infra Part II.A.
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effectiveness of those appointments. The data suggest, however, that
the role of creditors‘ committees warrants a closer look.29
The study includes 296 Chapter 11 cases, with 152 of those
cases involving one or more committees.30 Several analyses categorize
cases by committee type (no committee, single creditors‘ committee,
and multiple or other committee cases) for comparative purposes and
control for factors other than committee activity that might influence
outcomes. Other analyses focus on emerging trends in the data for all
cases. Part IV sets forth detailed analyses of the key data, and Part V
discusses their potential policy implications.
With respect to case duration, cases with no committees had
significantly shorter overall durations, but required significantly
longer periods of time to resolve motions to sell substantially all of the
debtor‘s assets.31 The lack of a committee did not impact the time
between the filing of a Chapter 11 case and confirmation of any plan of
reorganization or liquidation.32 Nevertheless, cases with no
committees were significantly less likely to have at least one formal
request for an extension of the debtor‘s exclusive periods to file and
solicit votes on a plan.33
Cases with a single creditors‘ committee were significantly
more likely than the other two categories to result in a plan of
liquidation or a motion to sell substantially all of the debtor‘s assets.34
This result remained even after controlling for asset size and approval
of debtor-in-possession (―DIP‖) financing.35 Those cases also were
significantly more likely to provide distributions to unsecured
creditors in amounts less than or equal to fifty percent of their claim
values.36
The data also show discernible instances of potential conflicts
of interest held by committee members, and track litigation filed by
creditors‘ committees against secured creditors and debtors.37
Although both conflicts and litigation significantly increased the
estate‘s professional fees and expenses, they did not significantly
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra Part IV.B.
31. See infra Part IV.C. Analyses are based on comparative categories.
32. See infra Part IV.C.1. Analyses are based on comparative categories.
33. See infra Part IV.C.1. Analyses are based on comparative categories.
34. See infra Part IV.C.3.
35. For an explanation of the multivariate analyses, see infra Part IV.C.3. The data
analysis also considered other possible confounding variables such as the number of creditors,
liabilities and secured claims. See infra Part IV.C.3.
36. See infra Part IV.C.4. This result remained after controlling for identified confounding
variables. See infra Part IV.C.4.
37. See infra Part IV.D.
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affect whether a debtor reorganized or liquidated or the percentage
recovery to general unsecured creditors.38 The data on creditors‘
committee litigation against debtors do suggest, however, that
committees are fulfilling at least part of their oversight
responsibilities with some zeal.
The lack of a strong association between conflicts and disputes,
on the one hand, and value, on the other, in Chapter 11 cases supports
digging deeper into the data and anecdotal evidence to explain the
effect of creditors‘ committees on Chapter 11 cases.39 Part V engages
in this analysis and considers, among other things, the potential
influence of the identity of committee members, the dynamics of
committee versus no-committee cases, and disclosure obligations. It
concludes by encouraging more strategic decisions regarding the role
of multiple committees and the composition of single committees in
Chapter 11 cases and highlighting the value of increased disclosure
obligations for all Chapter 11 participants.
II. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CREDITORS‘ COMMITTEES
The concept of a creditors‘ committee has great appeal. It
signifies representation and cooperation—key elements of most
successful debt restructuring plans. It also presents a potential
solution to the collective action problem that often impairs debt
restructuring efforts.40 Nevertheless, in many cases, the committee
structure appears to fail its intended beneficiaries.41

38. See infra Part IV.D.3. Notably, cases involving committee litigation against the debtor
also are significantly longer than cases without such litigation. See infra Part IV.D.3.
39. See infra Parts IV.D, V.
40. Collective action problems arise for creditors of troubled companies because those
creditors often are dispersed and the cost of collection efforts may outweigh the value of any
individual creditor‘s claim against the company. See generally David Arthur Skeel, The Nature
and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992)
(explaining collective action problems in both the shareholder and creditor context, as well as the
contemplated role of creditors‘ committees in this context). These and other factors can
discourage individual creditor involvement and impede individual creditor effectiveness in the
debt restructuring process. The Bankruptcy Code seeks to use the committee structure to
address at least part of this collective action problem. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy
Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 347 (1993) (―The creditors‘ committee
is designed to accomplish effective creditor involvement at the lowest possible costs.‖); see also
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 680 (1993) (discussing
the collective action problem and the role of creditors‘ committees in drafting reorganization
plans); Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J.
405, 421 (2007) (discussing collective action problem); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S.
Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. L. REV.
1357, 1394 (2000) (―The Bankruptcy Code‘s solution to this collective action problem is to place
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This Part summarizes the development of the creditors‘
committee and its governance role in the Chapter 11 process. This
discussion leads to a brief overview of the perceived flaws in the
committee structure and the prior empirical studies that reference
Chapter 11 committee performance.42 The background information
provided here underscores the importance of the study reported in this
Article and facilitates a more meaningful analysis of the data.
A. The Historical Development of Creditors’ Committees
The relationship between a corporation and its creditors largely
is governed by negotiated contract terms.43 As long as the corporation
is solvent and complying with the terms of its various creditor
contracts, the corporation‘s board of directors and management can
focus on operating the business and maintaining the corporation‘s
relationship with its shareholders.44 Once the corporation experiences
financial distress, however, this focus frequently shifts to managing
the corporation‘s relationship with its creditors—a daunting task for
most corporations.45 The following discussion summarizes the role of
the drafting of a large, publicly held company‘s reorganization plan in the hands of creditors‘
committees.‖).
41. See, e.g., Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate
Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 119–24 (1998) (discussing
persistence of collection action problems in Chapter 11, including shareholder apathy and
conflict between corporate governance norms and the primary goals of the Bankruptcy Code).
42. See infra Parts II.B, C.
43. See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 876–79 (Del. Ch. 1986) (―Under our
law—and the law generally—the relationship between a corporation and the holders of its debt
securities, even convertible debt securities, is contractual in nature.‖).
44. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 41, at 107–10 (1998) (explaining the inherent conflict
between creditors and shareholders and discussing management‘s role in mitigating this conflict
through ―[management‘s] control over the selection of business projects [that] enables them to
choose between satisfying the shareholders‘ appetite for risk and observing the creditors‘ distaste
for such projects‖).
45. See id. (discussing governance challenges in insolvency context); see also Kelli A. Alces,
Strategic Governance, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1053, 1054–60 (2008) (same); Steven L. Schwarcz,
Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 651–60 (1996)
(reflecting on the boundaries of corporate obligations to creditors, especially where they conflict
with obligations to shareholders). Courts and commentators debate whether management‘s
fiduciary duties, as well as their focus, shift to creditors at any point as a company‘s finances
deteriorate. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d
92, 103 (Del. 2007) (stating that a solvent or nearly solvent corporation owes no duties to
creditors); Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr. & Christopher W. Frost, Managers’ Fiduciary Duties in
Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere), 32 J. CORP. L. 491,
508–12 (2007) (discussing courts‘ different treatment of boards‘ fiduciary duties to shareholders
and creditors); Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to
Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1332–35 (2007) (same); Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors’
Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L.
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creditors‘ committees prior to the enactment of federal corporate
reorganization laws, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and then
under the current Bankruptcy Code.
1. Committees and Equity Receiverships
A corporation‘s creditors typically are widely dispersed with
various (often competing) economic interests and agendas.
Consequently, even before Congress incorporated business
reorganization provisions into federal bankruptcy laws, business
managers themselves embraced the concept of a creditors‘
committee.46 Early committees frequently were self-selected, limited to
a particular tranche of debt, and not necessarily formed to represent
the interests of the corporation‘s general creditor body.47
For example, in the early 1900s, corporations used a process
commonly called ―equity receivership‖ to restructure their debt
obligations. Under this process, a creditor filed a receivership petition
against the corporation in the federal district court, which then
appointed a receiver for the eventual sale of the company to the
highest bidder.48 In practice, this process often was orchestrated
between the corporation‘s management and creditors that were
friendly to management.49 Those creditors would petition the court for
the receivership and form a protective or reorganization committee. In
most cases, the reorganization committee, working with management,
would be the successful bidder at the receivership sale.50 The end
REV. 1189, 1236 (2003) (proposing that duties be based not on priorities but on ―imbalances of
volition, cognition, and exit‖); Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate
Fiduciary Duties for Creditors, 57 EMORY L.J. 809, 825 (2008) (explaining boards‘ fiduciary
duties to shareholders versus creditors and arguing against any expansion of such duties to
creditors).
46. See, e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT‘S DOMINION 56–60 (2001) (explaining equity
receivership process); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of
Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 747–49 (1990) (same); Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions
and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 74–77 (1991) (same);
Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 5, 21–23 (1995) (same).
47. See Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors’ Committees,
43 UCLA L. REV. 1547, 1553–55 (1996) (explaining committee role in equity receiverships).
48. See supra notes 46–47; see also Michelle M. Harner, The Search for an Unbiased
Fiduciary in Corporate Reorganizations, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492701 (explaining historical development of creditors‘ committee in
bankruptcy).
49. See Tabb, supra note 46, at 22 (―In practice, the equity receivership came to be
dominated by insiders, and was subject to much abuse.‖).
50. Id. (―In form, the receivership resulted in the sale of the debtor‘s assets, with the
proceeds distributed to creditors. In substance, however, the entire elaborate proceeding often
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result allowed management and the reorganization committee to
maintain control of the corporation while cashing out dissenting
creditors at a discounted price.
The use of committees in the equity receivership process
garnered significant criticism. The most vocal critic arguably was
Justice Douglas while he was working at the Securities and Exchange
Commission (―SEC‖).51 Justice Douglas believed that management and
large creditors abused the receivership process by closing out
dissenting creditors and chilling competitive bidding.52 In most cases,
dissenting creditors were forced out through a cash payment
representing a significant discount on the face value of their claim
against the company.53 Rather than maximizing entity value for
existing stakeholders, equity receiverships at their worst reallocated
that value to insiders and key creditors.
2. Committees and the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
Although Congress initially incorporated a business
reorganization chapter into federal bankruptcy law that was based on
the equity receivership process, it ultimately discarded that approach
in favor of a more paternal approach, at least for large public
companies.54 The change in approach arose in part from Justice
Douglas‘s concern about conflicts of interest.55 As a result, Chapter X
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which applied to large public

resulted in old management retaining control of the enterprise, and dictating the terms of the
sale.‖).
51. See Bussel, supra note 47, at 1556–57 (discussing abuses of process identified by
Justice Douglas during his tenure with the SEC).
52. Justice Douglas observed, ―In the welter of conflicting interests, ulterior objectives, and
self-serving actions which flow from investment banker-management dominance over
committees, these committees have lost sight of their essential functions which they can perform
to advance the interests of investors.‖ To Amend the Securities Act of 1933: Hearing on H.R. 6968
Before the H. Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm., 75th Cong. 24 (1937) (statement of
William O. Douglas).
53. See SKEEL, supra note 46, at 60 (explaining the practice of paying ―upset price‖ to
dissenting creditors).
54. See Bussel, supra note 47, at 1555–56 (―[Section 77B was] aptly described as ‗the old
equity receivership reorganization process pressed upon a bankruptcy mold, with additions.‘ ‖)
(quoting Carl D. Friebolin, Section 77B: Sword or Shield, 10 J. NAT‘L ASS‘N REF. BANKR. 79, 79
(1936)).
55. See SKEEL, supra note 46, at 106–09 (discussing the process to revamp section 77B);
Tabb, supra note 46, at 28–30 (describing efforts to rework section 77B, including Douglas‘s
investigation of the committee); see also SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION
COMMITTEES § IV (1937) (summarizing the strategy and techniques of reorganization).
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companies, did not include a formal role for creditors‘ committees.56
Instead, creditors‘ committees played a nominal role in Chapter X
cases.
Notably, Congress maintained the formal role of creditors‘
committees in the context of small business reorganizations codified in
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Unlike Chapter X, which was
largely controlled by an independent trustee and the SEC, Chapter XI
reorganizations were directed primarily by the business debtor and its
creditors‘ committee.57 Chapter XI charges creditors‘ committees with
overseeing the conduct of the debtor and negotiating the debtor‘s plan
of reorganization; for the most part, they were active participants in
cases.58 Commentators attribute the level of committee activity in
Chapter XI cases to the absence of a trustee or other formal
monitoring of the debtor.59
3. Committees and the Bankruptcy Code
The Chapter XI approach to business reorganization, including
its formal role for creditors‘ committees, prevailed when Congress
overhauled federal bankruptcy laws in 1978.60 The business
reorganization sections were collapsed into one chapter—the current
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code—that contemplates the
appointment of a creditors‘ committee in every business
reorganization case.61 Specifically, section 1102 of the Bankruptcy
Code states that ―the United States trustee shall appoint a committee
of creditors holding unsecured claims . . . . ordinarily consist[ing] of
the persons, willing to serve, that hold the seven largest claims
56. SEC v. Am. Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 603–06 (1965) (explaining the
development of the Chandler Act); Bussel, supra note 47, at 1557–58 (explaining key elements of
Chapter X).
57. See Bussel, supra note 47, at 1557–58 (explaining key elements of Chapter XI); see also
A. Mechele Dickerson, Privatizing Ethics in Corporate Reorganizations, 93 MINN. L. REV. 875,
888–89 (2009) (describing treatment of debtors and their management under Chapter X versus
Chapter XI).
58. Creditors‘ committees under Chapter XI were either elected by general unsecured
creditors or, if no elections were held, appointed by the court. See RICHARD F. BROUDE,
REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE § 3.02[1] (2005) (explaining the
selection and changes in composition of committees).
59. See id. (―Experience under the . . . Bankruptcy Act had been that creditors‘ committees
were more active in Chapter XI cases than Chapter X reorganization cases because, in the latter,
the trustee played the primary role in proposing and confirming a plan of reorganization.‖).
60. See SKEEL, supra note 46, at 136–45 (describing process and substantive decisions
relating to enactment of the Bankruptcy Code); Tabb, supra note 46, at 35–36 (discussing the
changes made in the 1978 overhaul).
61. See Tabb, supra note 46, at 35 (―Another notable feature of the 1978 law was the
merger of the reorganization chapters into a single chapter.‖).
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against the debtor of the kinds represented on such committee.‖62 The
U.S. trustee also may appoint additional statutory committees of
creditors or shareholders.63
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a troubled
company and its management to stay in possession and control of the
company‘s assets and operations during the reorganization process.64
Thus, the company operates as a ―debtor in possession.‖65 The
bankruptcy court may appoint a trustee or examiner to investigate or
run a debtor‘s business, but those appointments are the exception to
the general debtor-in-possession rule.66
Nevertheless, Chapter 11 does not contemplate unfettered
control for the debtor in possession. Most major transactions require
approval of the bankruptcy court, and the U.S. trustee oversees
general case administration matters.67 Moreover, Chapter 11 posits
the creditors‘ committee as a ―statutory watchdog,‖ with authority to

62. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)–(b) (2006).
63. Id. § 1102(a). For example, the U.S. trustee may appoint an official committee of trade
creditors or an official committee of equity holders. The decision to appoint multiple committees
frequently turns on the size of the Chapter 11 case, the level of creditor or shareholder interest
and whether a single committee can sufficiently represent all of the different claims or interests.
Although creditors‘ committees are the focus of this study, the data analyze different types of
committees, including multiple creditors‘ committees, equity committees, and ad hoc committees.
See infra Part IV.
64. See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 46, at 216–17 (discussing pro-debtor aspects of Chapter 11
in an historical context and noting that Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code adopted ―an
explicitly manager-friendly approach to corporate reorganization‖); J. Bradley Johnston, The
Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 293 (1991) (explaining management control in
Chapter 11 process and observing that ―[m]anagement‘s postpetition control of a debtor‘s
operations is complemented by specific, individual Code provisions which give management
substantial control over the reorganization process itself‖); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 40, at
688–94 (explaining historical grounds for management control in Chapter 11 context); see also
Harner, supra note 48 (manuscript at 27–32) (analyzing increased activism of debtholders and
implications for corporate insolvencies in the United States and the United Kingdom); George W.
Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 21–23 (2004) (explaining that ―[s]ince [the
Bankruptcy Code‘s enactment,] it has been portrayed as a debtor-friendly statute featuring a
fresh start for debtors and the prospect of reorganization for businesses‖ and positing that such
portrayal may be erroneous).
65. See § 1107(a)–(b) (explaining concept and duties of a debtor in possession).
66. § 1104(a) (appointment of Chapter 11 trustee); § 1104(c) (appointment of Chapter 11
examiner); § 1106(a)(1) (Chapter 11 trustee duties); see also In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d
1217, 1225–29 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming appointment of Chapter 11 trustee); Kelli A. Alces,
Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy, 56 KAN. L. REV. 83, 86 (2007) (noting that
replacing a debtor-in-possession with a public trustee is ―an extreme and expensive remedy‖);
Dickerson, supra note 57, at 898–900 (―Though the Code provides that managers can be replaced
or supervised by a public trustee, trustee appointments are, and always have been, rare.‖).
67. See, e.g., § 363(b) (requiring court approval of transactions outside of the ordinary
course of business); § 1129 (requiring court approval of plan of reorganization).
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investigate and monitor the DIP‘s conduct.68 Among other things, the
committee may: consult with the debtor; ―investigate the acts, conduct,
assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor‖; ―participate in
the formulation of a plan‖; and ―request the appointment of a trustee
or examiner.‖69
The legislative history of Chapter 11 suggests that Congress
intended the creditors‘ committee to give the general creditor body a
stronger voice in the reorganization process.70 Unsecured creditors
rarely involved themselves in the reorganization, either because they
were disinterested or not invited to the negotiation table.71 Part of the
purpose of section 1102 was to establish the committee as ―a vital and
integral part of the plan formulation process.‖72
The committee and its members are situated as fiduciaries for
creditors they represent.73 The U.S. trustee generally appoints
68. Courts and commentators invoke the phrase ―statutory watchdog‖ to describe the role
of the creditors‘ committee. See, e.g., In re AKF Foods, Inc., 36 B.R. 288, 289–90 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1984) (―The function of a creditors‘ committee is to act as a watchdog on behalf of the larger body
of creditors which it represents.‖); W. Michael Schuster, For the Greater Good: The Use of Public
Policy Considerations in Confirming Chapter 11 Plans of Reorganization, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 467,
495 (2009) (quoting the phrase as used in various cases).
69. § 1103(c) (setting forth powers of committee); see also BROUDE, supra note 58, §3.02[4]
(explaining powers granted creditors‘ committees under § 1103).
70. The legislative history to § 1102 provides:
This section provides for the appointment of creditors‘ and equity security holders‘
committees, which will be the primary negotiating bodies for the formulation of the
plan of reorganization. They will represent the various classes of creditors and equity
security holders from which they are selected. They will also provide supervision of
the debtor in possession and of the trustee, and will protect their constituents‘
interests.
H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 401 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6357.
71. ― ‗Creditors . . . take little interest in pursuing a bankruptcy debtor. They are unwilling
to throw good money after bad.‘ ‖ Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 247 (1983) (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 95–595, at 92); see also infra note 101 and accompanying text (explaining factors
contributing to committee ineffectiveness).
72. Retail Mktg. Co. v. Nw. Nat‘l Bank (In re Mako, Inc.), 120 B.R. 203, 212 (Bankr. E.D.
Okla. 1990); see also BROUDE, supra note 58, § 3.02[1] (explaining that the ―drafters felt that
creditors‘ committees should play a greater role in Chapter 11 cases‖); Harvey R. Miller, The
Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, Director, and
Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431, 449 (1995) (―The
mandatory appointment of a creditors‘ committee was intended to provide dynamic tension with
the debtor that would stimulate the reorganization process through effective and efficient
oversight and negotiation.‖).
73. See, e.g., In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 265 B.R. 427, 432 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2001) (―Members of the committee also have another duty—a fiduciary duty to all creditors
represented by the committee.‖); In re Firstplus Fin., Inc., 254 B.R. 888, 894 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2000) (―In a Chapter 11 case, an Unsecured Creditors‘ Committee is appointed by the Office of
the United States Trustee and owes a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of all unsecured creditors.‖).
For thoughtful discourse regarding issues posed by a fiduciary label for the committee and others
in bankruptcy, see C.R. Bowles, Jr. & Nancy B. Rapoport, Has the DIP’s Attorney Become the
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members to the creditors‘ committee and determines the need for the
appointment of any additional committees in the Chapter 11 case.74
The U.S. trustee selects committee members based on the size and
nature of the creditor‘s claims against the debtor and a questionnaire
that the creditor itself completes.75 A committee typically consists of
seven to nine of the debtor‘s largest unsecured creditors.76 These
creditors may hold interests, however, that are adverse to the debtor
or other members of the committee.77
The members of a creditors‘ committee can wield significant
influence in a Chapter 11 case.78 They obtain access to the debtor‘s

Ultimate Creditors’ Lawyer in Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases?, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47,
53–54 (1997); see also Susan M. Freeman, Are DIP and Committee Counsel Fiduciaries for Their
Clients’ Constituents or the Bankruptcy Estate? What is a Fiduciary, Anyway?, 17 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 291 (2009) (providing a detailed analysis of debtor in possession and committee as
fiduciaries). In general, a fiduciary duty exists where ―one party to a fiduciary relation (the
entrustor) is dependent on the other (the fiduciary).‖ Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L.
REV. 795, 800 (1983).
74. § 1102(a)(1); see also Klee & Shaffer, supra note 2, at 1001–04 (providing a detailed
analysis of the formation process); Greg M. Zipes & Lisa L. Lambert, Creditors' Committee
Formation Dynamics: Issues in the Real World, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229, 229–30, 239 (2003)
(explaining committee formation process).
75. The U.S. trustee typically mails questionnaires to the debtor‘s largest creditors asking,
among other things, about their interest in serving on the committee and the details of their
claims against the debtor. U.S. TRUSTEE PROGRAM, U.S. DEP‘T JUSTICE, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
MANUAL: CHAPTER 11 CASE ADMINISTRATION 3–4.2 to 3–4.4 (1998), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ust_org/ustp_manual/docs/vol3.pdf.
76. See Klee & Shaffer, supra note 2, at 1005–06; Zipes & Lambert, supra note 74, 233–34.
77. See, e.g., Robert P. Enayati, Undermining the Trading Wall: The BAPCPA’s Affront on
the Creditors’ Committee’s Duty of Confidentiality in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 703, 706 (2008) (discussing issues posed by misappropriation of confidential information
by, among others, creditors‘ committee members); Burke Gappmayer, Protecting the Insolvent:
How a Creditor’s Committee Can Prevent Its Constituents from Misusing a Debtor’s Nonpublic
Information and Preserve Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 439, 445–46
(discussing conflicts of interest that may affect creditors‘ committee members); see also Carl A.
Eklund & Lynn W. Roberts, The Problem with Creditors’ Committees in Chapter 11: How to
Manage the Inherent Conflicts Without Loss of Function, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 130–33
(1997) (analyzing problems posed by committee member conflicts); Nancy B. Rapoport, Turning
and Turning in the Widening Gyre: The Problem of Potential Conflicts of Interest in Bankruptcy,
26 CONN. L. REV. 913, 916–17 (1994) (examining conflict of interest issues in bankruptcy,
including in committee context); Michael P. Richman & Jonathan E. Aberman, Creditors’
Committees Under the Microscope: Recent Developments Highlight Hazards of Self-Dealing, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2007, at 22 (examining Chapter 11 cases involving committee member
conflicts of interest).
78. See, e.g., John D. Ayer et al., What Every Unsecured Creditor Should Know About
Chapter 11, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2004, at 16, 40 (―Because the fees for these professionals
are paid by the chapter 11 debtor‘s estate, membership on the unsecured creditors‘ committee is
probably the most cost-effective way for individual unsecured creditors to influence the outcome
of a bankruptcy case and protect their interests.‖). Interestingly, the most popular response in
the professional and committee member surveys regarding how creditors most frequently
attempt to influence Chapter 11 cases was seeking appointment to the creditors‘ committee.
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confidential and proprietary information; they are involved in
negotiations regarding the debtor‘s reorganization; and their support
generally is necessary for the debtor‘s successful reorganization.79
Both the bankruptcy court and other general unsecured creditors rely
on the committee and will, to varying degrees, defer to the committee‘s
assessment.80
This influence can be used for the benefit of all unsecured
creditors or, in some instances, the self-interest of the committee
members.81 In the latter scenario, a member can use its position to get
the debtor‘s ear and, for example, convince the debtor to pay attention
to that member‘s claims or contracts or even to pursue a particular
restructuring course.82 This influence can be subtle and hard to detect,
but the consequences can be devastating for the debtor and its
stakeholders.
B. The Many Roles of Committees
A creditors‘ committee can play a pivotal role in a Chapter 11
case. It can investigate the debtor‘s operations, review the debtor‘s
business plan, and help the debtor evaluate viable restructuring
options.83 When that process reveals troubling information, the
committee can seek the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee, an

79. See, e.g., Brad B. Erens & Kelly M. Neff, Confidentiality in Chapter 11, 22 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 47, 72–77 (2005) (discussing the sharing of confidential information in Chapter
11 and related issues); John T. Hansen, Pushing the Envelope of Creditors’ Committee’s Powers,
80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 89, 91–92 (2006) (exploring the parameters of committee power in Chapter
11); Klee & Shaffer, supra note 2, at 1040–41 (discussing the powers and conduct of committees
in Chapter 11 cases); Schuster, supra note 68, at 495–96 (explaining role of the committee in the
plan process).
80. See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83
AM. BANKR. L.J. 663, 690 (2009) (―More recently, as chapter 11 practice has become more
centered on financing orders and § 363 sales to which the statutory solicitation and voting
procedures do not apply, the bankruptcy courts increasingly look to the creditors‘ committee as
the proxy for unsecured creditor interests.‖).
81. Consider the following observations by one court:
[T]he individuals constituting a committee should be honest, loyal, trustworthy and
without conflicting interests, and with undivided loyalty and allegiance to their
constituents. Conflicts of interest on the part of representative persons or committees
are thus not . . . tolerated. Thus, where a committee representative or agent seeks to
represent or advance the interest of an individual member of a competing class of
creditors or various interests or groups whose purposes and desires are dissimilar,
this fiduciary is in breach of his duty of loyal and disinterested service.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Doan (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 919, 925 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citations omitted); see also infra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing pros
and cons of serving on a creditors‘ committee).
82. See cases cited infra Part II.B.
83. See supra Part II.A.3.
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examiner, or an alternative management team. The committee also
can be an ally for the debtor in its negotiations with secured creditors
and potential postpetition lenders or purchasers. Debtors often use the
refrain, ―Management would like to pursue this deal but the creditors‘
committee will never sign off on it.‖84
Just as frequently, however, a creditors‘ committee can be an
antagonist to the debtor or other parties in interest.85 This additional
pressure may be warranted or it may be suspect and at the behest of
specific committee members.86 The FiberMark case described above
illustrates committee conduct orchestrated by two members that
arguably prolonged the debtor‘s case and decreased overall value.87
Similar cases include the Chapter 11 cases of American
Manufacturers, Adelphia Communications, Galey & Lord, and
WorldCom.88 In addition, conflict between the creditors‘ committee
84. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. THURMAN ET AL., CRITICAL ISSUES FACING THE CORPORATE CLIENT
CONSIDERING CHAPTER 11 IN TODAY‘S ECONOMY § II.A.2.e (Mar. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.utahbar.org/cle/springconvention/materials/bankruptcy_section.pdf (―The Committee
can be an extremely valuable ally or your worst enemy in the Debtor‘s efforts to reorganize.
Communicating often and openly with the Committee‘s counsel will be a must for Debtor‘s
counsel if the Debtor intends to succeed in its reorganization efforts.‖).
85. See In re SmartWorld Tech., LLC, 552 F.3d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 2009) (referring to
bankruptcy court decision that explained the ― ‗divergent positions regarding litigation and
settlement strategy . . . between the Debtor and the Committee‘ and the desire of the former to
benefit its equity holders rather than its creditors‖ and noting that ― ‗some degree of antagonism
and animosity between a debtor and creditor can be expected in any bankruptcy proceeding‘ . . .
[because] both entities seek to maximize their shares of a finite (and always inadequate) pool of
resources‖); James M. Sullivan & Gary O. Ravert, A Vendor’s Guide to Bankruptcy, 2006
BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 494, 499–500, available at http://www.mwe.com/info/pubs/bloomberg_
sullivan_ravert.pdf (explaining pros and cons to serving on creditors‘ committee and noting, with
the caveat of a member‘s fiduciary duty, that the committee‘s ―increased access [to the debtor
and its information] can often foster improved business relations between a committee member
and the debtor both during a chapter 11 case and after a chapter 11 case is over‖).
86. For example, a creditors‘ committee may identify questionable prepetition conduct that
supports the appointment of an examiner or trustee. See, e.g., Dan Nakaso, Hawaiian Air
Creditors Seek Bankruptcy Trustee, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, May 3, 2003, at A1, available at
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2003/May/03/bz/bz01a.html (creditors committee sought
and obtained Chapter 11 trustee appointment). Alternatively, the committee may act beyond its
statutory authority and expose the debtor‘s estate to potential losses. See, e.g., Luedke v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 159 B.R. 385, 389–90 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (alleging that the committee breached its
fiduciary duty to plaintiffs through manipulative conduct during reorganization); In re 3DFX
Interactive, Inc., No. 02–55795 JRG, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1498, at *8–10 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June
29, 2006) (creditors‘ committee allegedly negotiated sale under proposed liquidating plan not in
good faith and without involving U.S. trustee or other committee).
87. See supra notes 5–24 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc‘ns Corp., 386 B.R. 140, 147 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(explaining conflict and resulting years of delay in sale and plan process); In re Adelphia
Commc‘ns Corp., 345 B.R. 69, 73–74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); David Peress & Thomas C.
Prinzhorn, Nontraditional Lenders and the Impact of Loan-to-Own Strategies on the
Restructuring Process, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2006, at 48, 57–58 (discussing the dispute in
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and the debtor, secured lenders, or other parties in interest—whether
or not motivated by self-interest—can delay a case and affect value,
such as in the Chapter 11 cases of Brown Publishing, Chesapeake
Corp., Lyondell Chemical Co., Six Flags, Stations Casino, and Tribune
Co.89
The potential for a committee or a few committee members to
hijack or derail a debtor‘s restructuring efforts is troubling. It weakens
the Chapter 11 process by eliminating one (and perhaps the most
knowledgeable) check on the debtor‘s conduct and proposed
reorganization plan—the bankruptcy court. Although the bankruptcy
court oversees the Chapter 11 case and must approve any major
transactions, the court ultimately must rely on the debtor and the
creditors‘ committee for relevant information.90 A self-interested
committee can skew the court‘s and outside parties‘ perspectives of the

American Remanufacturers and noting that ―[a]fter four days of confusing disputes about
definitions of third parties, priming and subordination, the company lawyers informed the court
that the company had run out of cash and converted to a chapter 7 liquidation‖); Richman &
Aberman, supra note 77, at 22, 60–63 (discussing conflicts and related issues raised in cases of
FiberMark, Galey & Lord and WorldCom).
89. See, e.g., Third Amended Disclosure Statement Accompanying Third Amended Joint
Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for the LyondellBasell Debtors at 44–45, 53–56, In re
Lyondell Chem. Co., No. 09–10023 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2010) (explaining litigation
instituted by committee against debtors and certain lenders, the examiner‘s report finding no
inappropriate conduct in connection with proposed plan that included providing equity to lenders
and ultimate settlement of litigation); see also Emily Chasan, Fight over What Six Flags Is Worth
Could Get Ugly, REUTERS, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/04/us-sixflagsidUSTRE5B30AR20091204 (explaining disputes among creditors, including creditors‘ committee,
regarding valuation and control of reorganized debtor); Steve Green, Station Casinos Reaches
Deal with Key Lenders, LAS VEGAS SUN, Feb. 25, 2010, available at http://www.
lasvegassun.com/news/2010/feb/25/station-reaches-deal-key-lenders-hopes-emerge-bank/
(explaining dispute among the creditors‘ committee and other parties over control of
reorganization process); Tom Hals, Tribune’s Creditors Warn of “World War” Legal Fight,
REUTERS, Feb. 12, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1216183020100212 (―Tribune Co‘s
senior creditors warned that allowing bondholders to sue over the legitimacy of $10 billion of the
bankrupt company‘s debt would touch off ‗World War III‘ and upend settlement talks, according
to court documents.‖); Louis Lovio & John Reid Blackwell, Sale OK’d Despite Protest, RICHMOND
TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 24, 2009, at B7 (explaining creditors‘ committee‘s objections to debtor‘s
sale process and noting that court rejected objections in approving sale); Ben Sutherly, Brown
Publishing, Creditors Clash Over Sale Plans, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 27, 2010, at C1,
available at http://www.daytondailynews.com/business/brown-publishing-creditors-clash-oversale-plans-785011.html (committee objected to sale process in which secured lenders were credit
bidding). Interestingly, most of these disputes concerned contests for control of the reorganized
company or its value. The spouse of one of the authors is a lawyer in the corporate restructuring
field and represented parties in the Six Flags and Stations Casino cases. Nonetheless, the
authors‘ knowledge of, and all information in this Article regarding, these and other cases are
based solely on the publicly available sources cited herein.
90. See Harner, supra note 48, Part III.B (discussing challenges faced by bankruptcy courts
in resolving Chapter 11 cases based solely on information often strategically disclosed by the
parties).
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Chapter 11 case and foster a resolution that might not maximize
value.
C. Prior Empirical Studies of the Chapter 11 Process
Several scholars have produced thoughtful empirical studies of
the Chapter 11 process. These studies generally fall into one of five
broad categories: adherence to the absolute priority rule;91 corporate
governance issues;92 costs and expenses;93 secured and debtor-in91. See, e.g., Brian L. Betker, Management’s Incentives, Equity’s Bargaining Power, and
Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 68 J. BUS. 161, 161 (1995)
(explaining that the article will ―examine[ ] the cross-sectional determinants of absolute priority
deviations‖ in selected Chapter 11 bankruptcies); Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An
Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747, 748 (1989) (discussing
the absolute priority rule and deviations from absolute priority).
92. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small
Business Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2368 (2005) (―Intelligent reform needs to be
grounded . . . on the effects of Chapter 11 on entrepreneurs‘ career trajectories.‖); Catherine M.
Daily & Dan R. Dalton, Corporate Governance and the Bankrupt Firm: An Empirical Assessment,
15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 643, 643–44 (1994) (examining the impact of the composition of a
company‘s board of directors and board leadership structure on Chapter 11 filings); Catherine M.
Daily, Governance Patterns in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 355, 356
(1996) (analyzing the effect of ―audit committee composition and institutional investor holdings‖
on bankruptcy reorganizations); Jocelyn D. Evans & Corliss L. Green, Marketing Strategy,
Constituent Influence, and Resource Allocation: An Application of the Miles and Snow Typology
to Closely Held Firms in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 5011 J. BUS. RES. 225, 225–50 (2000) (―The
objective of this study is to examine whether the managers‘ emphasis on marketing is related to
the firms‘ likelihood of emerging from Chapter 11 as an independent entity.‖); Stuart C. Gilson &
Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially Distressed Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1007 (1994) (examining creditor control in firms facing financial
difficulties); M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation When
Agency Costs Are Low, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1594–618 (2007) (analyzing CEO compensation
at financially troubled corporations); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over
Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 124, 126 (1990) (finding a deviation from the absolute priority rule in an empirical
analysis of Chapter 11 bankruptcies); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Compensating
Unsecured Creditors for Extraordinary Bankruptcy Reorganization Risks, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1133,
1146 (1994) (proposing a policy to ―reduce the incentives for creditors to attempt to capture
control of management‖); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 40, at 673 (analyzing the effect of
creditor and shareholder influence over management on the value of financially distressed
companies); Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Trustees in Trouble: Holding Bankruptcy Trustees
Personally Liable for Professional Negligence, 35 CONN. L. REV. 525, 525–27 (exploring the scope
of the liability of bankruptcy trustees) (2003).
93. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, AM. BANKR. INST., CHAPTER 11 PROFESSIONAL FEE STUDY
vi (2007) (analyzing professional fees in Chapter 11 bankruptcies); Edward I. Altman, A Further
Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1067 (1984) (assessing
―both the direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy‖); Brian L. Betker, The Administrative Costs of
Debt Restructurings: Some Recent Evidence, FIN. MGMT., Winter 1997, at 56, 56; Avner Kalay et
al., Is Chapter 11 Costly?, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 772, 795 (2007) (―Overall, our empirical evidence is
inconsistent with the hypothesis that Chapter 11 results in net indirect costs.‖); Robert M.
Lawless et al., A Glimpse at Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Small Firm
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possession financing;94 and overall effectiveness.95 Notably, none of
these studies focus on the intricacies of committee relations and
operations in Chapter 11 and their potential impact on the process.
Nevertheless, some prior studies provide valuable insights
regarding the committee‘s role in Chapter 11. This study in turn seeks
to build on those observations and contribute an in-depth assessment
of Chapter 11 committees to the literature. For example, in their study
titled Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, Kenneth Ayotte
and Edward Morrison analyze the extent and effect of creditor control
and conflict in Chapter 11.96 Their study is important for multiple
reasons, including its empirical support for the increasing control
Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 847, 847 (analyzing ―professional fees and direct costs in
small firm bankruptcies‖).
94. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in
Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 513 (2009) (identifying the impact that creditor control
and creditor conflict have on Chapter 11 bankruptcies of large corporations); Sris Chatterjee et
al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 3097, 3098 (2004) (analyzing debtorin-possession financing); Sandeep Dahiya et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy
Resolution: Empirical Evidence, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 259 (2003) (analyzing whether debtor-inpossession financing produces overinvestment).
95. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
69, 99 (2004) (summarizing the reasons why Chapter 11 bankruptcy has been particularly
effective for large corporations); Baird & Morrison, supra note 92, at 2319 (examining the
bankruptcy docket of one court during a single year); Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 Case
Management and Delay Reduction: An Empirical Study, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 86 (1996)
(analyzing the ―fast track‖ method of bankruptcy case management and the resulting less delay
it produces); Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical
Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 969–71
(1999) (explaining the shift from New York to Delaware as the preferred choice of forums for
adjudicating bankruptcy disputes); Jonathan C. Lipson, Understanding Failure: Examiners and
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Public Companies, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 5–6 (2010)
(analyzing factors that lead to the appointment of examiners in Chapter 11 cases); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 103 (1983) [hereinafter LoPucki, Debtor I] (analyzing the effect of
lack of creditor control in Chapter 11 cases in the Western District of Missouri); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 247 (1983) [hereinafter LoPucki, Debtor II] (same); Wilbur N.
Moulton & Howard Thomas, Bankruptcy as a Deliberate Strategy: Theoretical Considerations
and Empirical Evidence, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 125, 125 (1993) (discussing reasons for the
continued use bankruptcies despite their high cost); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 603
(2009) (responding to critics of Chapter 11 bankruptcies and arguing that it is an effective tool);
Douglas Baird et al., The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study
33 (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 05–29, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=866865 (―The cold reality is that Chapter 11 does nothing or
close to nothing for ordinary general creditors in the typical small business bankruptcy.‖);
Stephen J. Lubben, Chapter 11 “Failure” 3 (Seton Hall Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 1375163,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1375163 (empirically
describing why firms fail in Chapter 11 bankruptcies).
96. Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 94, at 511.
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exercised by creditors in Chapter 11, which represents a shift from the
more traditional notion of debtor or shareholder influence over
Chapter 11.97 They also collect and analyze data regarding objections
filed by creditors‘ committees and conclude that ―[t]hese [unsecured
creditors‘ committee] objections suggest strongly that, in a large
number of cases, the managers of the corporation are not acting to
maximize the returns of unsecured creditors, who are often the firm‘s
residual claimants.‖98
A study by Lynn LoPucki, titled The Debtor in Full Control—
Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, takes a
different perspective on Chapter 11 in a different time period, but also
considers committee activity in the process.99 The LoPucki study was
performed shortly after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and
provides early empirical insight regarding the use of creditors‘
committees under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. It posits that
―[c]reditors‘ committees were appointed in only 40% of cases, fewer
than half of these committees employed counsel, and in general the
committees were ineffective.‖100 It also analyzes potential causes of
committee ineffectiveness and suggests that lack of incentives,
unqualified members, committee form, and member geographic
dispersion may contribute to the problem.101
Likewise, in an updated analysis of business failures in
Chapter 11, Stephen Lubben presents data explaining factors that
predict the likelihood of a Chapter 11 case being converted to a case
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or dismissed.102 The study
invokes a thoughtful regression model to identify and eliminate
potential causes of business failure (defined as conversion or
dismissal) in Chapter 11.103 The study concludes, among other things,

97. See id. at 538 (―Creditors dictate the dynamics of the reorganization process.‖).
98. Id. at 526. According to the study, ―[j]unior creditors, acting through a creditors‘
committee, filed objections in more than 50 percent of the cases.‖ Id. at 514.
99. See LoPucki, Debtor I, supra note 95, at 100 (discussing the frequency with which
creditors‘ committees are used in Chapter 11 bankruptcies); LoPucki, Debtor II, supra note 95, at
249–53 (discussing the role of creditors‘ committees under the Bankruptcy Code).
100. LoPucki Debtor I, supra note 95, at 100.
101. LoPucki Debtor II, supra note 95, at 251–52; see also Eklund & Roberts, supra note 77,
at 129 (―[A creditor‘s] acceptance of an active participatory role in a bankruptcy proceeding
through service on a committee is most likely motivated by each committee member‘s interest in
obtaining the maximum possible return on its claim.‖); Catherine E. Vance & Paige Barr, The
Facts & Fiction of Bankruptcy Reform, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 361, 389 (2003) (suggesting
similar factors as limiting effectiveness of committees).
102. See Lubben, supra note 95, at 3–5 (outlining the factor that can cause Chapter 11
bankruptcies to fail).
103. See id. at 7–9 (describing the regression model and the variables used).
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that the appointment of a committee suggests creditor interest in the
case and, consequently, a lower probability that the case will fail.104
The study in this Article takes these and similar important
findings regarding various aspects of committees in Chapter 11 and
presents the first comprehensive analysis of committee work. The
study recognizes and accounts for the numerous factors that may
impact a Chapter 11 case. Its findings also are supplemented by
survey data collected from Chapter 11 professionals and former
committee members to incorporate off-docket influences—for example,
events and personal dynamics not included in motions, objections, and
other pleadings filed on the court‘s docket. The authors devoted
significant attention to the design and analysis of the study to
generate an accurate and complete as possible picture of a committee‘s
role in Chapter 11. The details of the study‘s methodology and
primary findings are explained in the next Part.
III. STUDY METHODOLOGY
The study‘s primary objective is to provide data on the function
of creditors‘ committees in Chapter 11 cases and assess, among other
things, how creditors‘ committees impact value allocation among the
debtor‘s various stakeholders. The study‘s design reflects this
objective, collecting data from a cross-section of business bankruptcy
cases in three primary and three supplemental jurisdictions (the case
database). In addition, the authors conducted a separate survey study
of 600 individuals who either served as a committee member or as a
professional in one or more of the Chapter 11 cases included in the
case database.105 The survey data are presented in a separate study,
but are also referenced in this Article as applicable.106 The following
discussion explains the components of the case database and the
general design and scope of the study.

104. Id. at 14.
105. Specifically, once the case database was completed, the authors and coders identified
counsel to the debtor and any creditors‘ committee and any committee members in each of the
cases in the database. The Bureau then randomly selected 300 professionals and 300 committee
members for inclusion in the survey database. The Bureau also made every reasonable effort to
verify contact information for these individuals.
106. 252 professionals and 212 committee members were contacted and met eligibility
criteria. Ultimately, 77 (30.7%) professionals and 48 (22.5%) committee members participated in
the survey. Both are valid response rates for these types of surveys.
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A. The Case Database
The case database consists of 296 Chapter 11 cases filed during
2002–2008.107 This time period captures the end of the previous
economic downturn, the prosperity of the mid-2000s, and the
beginning of the most recent economic downturn. Accordingly, it
provides data that are representative of different points of the
economic cycle. The case database contains information about each of
these cases from the date of the filing of the case through the case
being closed by the court or June 30, 2009, whichever is earlier, with
certain supplements through June 30, 2010.108
Many large business bankruptcy cases are filed in the District
of Delaware and the Southern District of New York.109 The study
collects data from each of these jurisdictions, as well as the Northern
District of Illinois (which has a more moderate business bankruptcy
filing rate), for each of the years included in the study.110 In addition,
the study includes Chapter 11 cases filed in three additional
jurisdictions—the Central District of California, the District of
Maryland, and the Northern District of Ohio—for the years 2004 and
2006.111 The data from the additional jurisdictions provide further

107. The case database includes one case filed in 2001. This case was the lead case in the
Chapter 11 cases of the lead debtor and its affiliates. One of the affiliate debtors filed its case in
2002 and was selected for the database through the stratified random selection process.
Consistent with the study‘s methodology, the lead case was substituted for the eliminated
affiliate case. The authors considered replacing this case but elected to retain it for consistency
purposes and because it was filed only five months before the study period.
108. For cases coded as ―unresolved‖ as of June 30, 2009, the authors performed additional
analyses to incorporate data from the docket regarding any sales, plans of reorganization or
liquidation or other resolutions recorded between June 30, 2009 and June 30, 2010. As of June
30, 2010, only 12 of the 296 cases in the database are coded as unresolved.
109. The case database includes approximately 10% of all qualifying Chapter 11 cases filed
in the Southern District of New York during the study period and approximately 26% of all
qualifying Chapter 11 cases filed in the District of Delaware during the study period. Appendix A
describes the process for identifying qualifying Chapter 11 cases.
110. The case database includes approximately 23% of all qualifying Chapter 11 cases filed
in the Northern District of Illinois during the study period. Appendix A describes the process for
identifying qualifying Chapter 11 cases.
111. The case database includes approximately 16% of all qualifying Chapter 11 cases filed
in the Northern District of California during the study period, 32% of all qualifying Chapter 11
cases filed in the District of Maryland during the study period, and approximately 44% of all
qualifying Chapter 11 cases filed in the Northern District of Ohio during the study period.
Appendix A describes the process for identifying qualifying Chapter 11 cases. The years 2004
and 2006 were selected to collect data from these additional jurisdictions in time periods both
before and after the October 17, 2005 general effective date of certain amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109–8, § 436(b), 119 Stat. 23, 113 (2005) (discussing changes in the law regarding ―Duties
in Small Business Cases‖).
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diversity in the types of case filings. As a result, the study evaluates
data from jurisdictions in six different federal judicial circuits.112
Given the authors‘ desire to test meaningful differences
between jurisdictions and over time, the authors used a stratified
random sample. Specifically, the population of eligible Chapter 11
business cases was segregated into groups by jurisdiction and by year
filed. The sample was then selected from each group using equal
probability sampling.113 Also, given the authors‘ desire to test
meaningful differences within committee cases and then between
committee and noncommittee cases, the case database was
supplemented with a stratified random sample from the LoPucki
Business Bankruptcy Project (―BBP‖) database using the same
criteria.114 The authors used this approach because a majority of BBP
cases involve committees.
Based on these general guidelines, and as further explained in
Appendix A, 296 cases were selected for the case database. The
authors believe that the final case database represents a meaningful
cross-section of Chapter 11 cases filed in the United States between
2002 and 2008.
B. The Study’s Design and Scope
The authors also devoted significant time to creating, testing,
revising, and finalizing the project code book. Specifically, the authors
developed an initial code book and tested it on three Chapter 11 cases.
They then distributed the code book to three other coders, reviewed it
with them, and revised it based on their feedback. The authors and
coders tested the code book by coding numerous practice cases. After
this coding exercise, the team met with the Bureau of Sociological
Research (the ―Bureau‖) to review the test coding results. The authors
revised the code book based on the results and follow-up conversations

112. The selected jurisdictions represent the Second Circuit, Third Circuit, Fourth Circuit,
Sixth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, and Ninth Circuit.
113. The authors worked with the Bureau to determine a sample size that would provide
accurate and reliable data. The sample size of 296 cases generally corresponds with a confidence
interval of 5 and a confidence level of 95%. The sample size and the selection of the overall
population itself also were determined based in part on the budget for this project.
114. Lynn M. LoPucki, UCLA School of Law, Bankruptcy Research Database,
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/bankruptcy_research.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2011). Specifically, the
Bureau randomly selected 26 cases from the BBP, which represent 18% of the 146 cases in the
BBP population. This percentage corresponds to that reflected in the initial database of 270
cases, which is approximately 18% of the total 1,499 cases in the overall population. The coders
for this study then collected all of the data for those cases from the courts‘ dockets in accordance
with the codebook and procedures applicable to the other cases included in the case database.

2b. Harner_Marincic_Page.doc

2011]

4/27/2011 11:46 AM

COMMITTEE CAPTURE?

773

with the Bureau and coders. This process was repeated four times,
resulting in a final code book consisting of 129 primary variables and
an acceptable level of intercoder reliability.115
The primary variables included in the code book cover the
following general categories: general case information; general
committee information; committee activity; committee conflict;
allocation of ownership interests through plan or sale; general creditor
recoveries; and miscellaneous creditor information. The variables
within each category then identified specific information, such as the
pleading type, the filing party, and the ultimate resolution. Coders
thoroughly researched each case in the database assigned to them by
using PACER to identify, pull, and read documents relevant to the
coding variables. Accordingly, data entered in the database reflect
information on the court docket.
Upon completion of the coding process, the authors, with the
assistance of the Bureau, reviewed and reconciled any inconsistencies
in the case database. This process required only minor changes
throughout the database. The authors then commenced their analyses
of the data.
IV. KEY DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
As discussed in Part II, cases and scholarship suggest that
creditors are asserting more control in Chapter 11 cases.116 Creditors
are obtaining this control in a variety of ways, including through
covenants in contracts with the debtor and purchasing sizable claims
against the debtor‘s bankruptcy estate. Creditors also appear to be
vying for and using appointments to creditors‘ committees to obtain
information regarding, and leverage over, debtors.117 Such conduct
could alter significantly the committee‘s motivation and role in
115. The primary variables were broken down further into sub-variables to remove
subjective judgment from the coding process. In addition, the Bureau designed and monitored a
web-based entry system to reduce coder error throughout the process. Coders also double-coded
cases to insure intercoder reliability during the actual study.
116. See supra Part II.B; see also Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt
and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1237–42 (2006)
(explaining increased creditor control exercised through financing contracts); David A. Skeel,
Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 918,
923–27 (2003) (―Whereas the debtor and its managers seemed to dominate bankruptcy only a few
years ago, Chapter 11 now has a distinctively creditor-oriented cast.‖). The foregoing sources are
cited and the issues are discussed in Harner, supra note 48. Interestingly, approximately onethird of individuals responding to the professionals and committee member surveys observed an
increase in creditor control in Chapter 11 cases.
117. The potential consequences of increased creditor control are discussed in Harner, supra
note 48; see also Ayer et al., supra note 78 (discussing survey data).
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Chapter 11 cases, as well as the value of the bankruptcy estate and
ultimate returns to stakeholders.
Based on the legislative history to Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code and the contemplated role of creditors‘
committees,118 this study proposes the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis No. 1: Creditors‘ committees add value to Chapter
11 cases, as determined by returns to unsecured creditors and
company reorganizations.
Based on anecdotal evidence from Chapter 11 cases,119 this
study also proposes the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis No. 2: The presence or absence of conflict or selfinterest in the composition of creditors‘ committees impacts value in
Chapter 11 cases, as determined by returns to unsecured creditors and
company reorganizations.
The study collected a wealth of information regarding
committees in Chapter 11 cases. The depth of this information helped
the authors better understand the general functioning of committees
and, in turn, enhanced their analysis of the data and the primary
hypotheses. This Part first presents key background data to provide
context for the overall study. It then explains how the data were
analyzed based on case characteristics, including the presence of a
committee, the type of committee, and the results of the Chapter 11
case. The Part concludes by presenting data necessary to test the two
primary hypotheses. Although sample sizes are insufficient to
determine statistically whether any overall effects hold within each
jurisdiction, jurisdictions with observed patterns that differ from the
reported overall effect are mentioned in footnotes.
A. General Case Information
The Chapter 11 cases included in the case database reflect the
full range of potential Chapter 11 business debtors.120 Of the 296
cases, 85.5 percent involved debtors organized as corporations, 1.4
percent involved partnerships, one percent involved limited
118. See supra Part II.A.
119. See supra Part II.B.
120. As discussed supra Part III.A, the cases were systematically collected from six
jurisdictions. Accordingly, 29.4% of the cases were filed in the District of Delaware, 24.3% were
filed in the Northern District of Illinois, 25.3% were filed in the Southern District of New York,
6.8% were filed in the District of Maryland, 6.8% were filed in the Central District of California,
6.8% were filed in the Northern District of Ohio, and 0.7% were filed in the Southern District of
New York but subsequently transferred to another jurisdiction.
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partnerships, 11.1 percent involved limited liability companies, and
one percent were unknown. The majority of debtors were private
businesses, with twenty-five percent of the debtors identifying
themselves as public companies. In addition, 16.2 percent of the cases
were small business cases and 7.4 percent involved single asset real
estate debtors.121
The debtors operated in a variety of industries, with a
concentrated number operating in manufacturing (19.3 percent);
transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services
(12.8 percent); wholesale or retail trade (14.2 percent); finance,
insurance, and real estate (17.2 percent); and services (29.1
percent).122 Information collected from the debtors‘ schedules of assets
and liabilities indicate that the mean and median assets were
$903,250,000 and $2,508,000, respectively, and the mean and median
liabilities were $248,910,000 and $6,156,700, respectively.123 In
addition, the debtors‘ statements of financial affairs showed a mean
and median of $177,170,000 and $1,040,300, respectively, as the gross
annual income in the last full year preceding the Chapter 11
petition.124
According to debtors‘ Chapter 11 petitions, 65.9 percent of the
cases involved between 1–199 creditors, 12.8 percent involved 200–999
121. Certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code applicable to small business debtors
changed as a result of the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–8, § 436(b), 119 Stat. 23, 113
(2005). Among other things, the definition of ―small business debtor‖ in Section 101(51D) of the
Bankruptcy Code was amended such that a debtor ceases to be a small business debtor if the
U.S. trustee appoints a creditors‘ committee in the case. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D) (2006). To
ascertain whether this amendment affected the data, the authors analyzed the small business
debtor cases filed before and after October 17, 2005. That data are as follows: Prior to October
17, 2005, there were 17 (85%) NC cases, 3 (15%) UCC cases, and 0 OC cases involving a debtor
coded as a small business debtor. On or after October 17, 2005, there were 25 (89.3%) NC cases,
2 (7.1%) UCC cases, and 1 (3.6%) OC case involving a debtor coded as a small business debtor.
Although cell sizes were insufficient to perform an impact analysis, the descriptive data suggest
little variation in the two time periods.
122. Other industries represented in the database include agriculture, forestry, and fishing
(0.7%); mining (0.7% ); and construction (3.0%).
123. For consistency purposes, if a Chapter 11 case involved more than one debtor (that is,
the debtor‘s case was jointly administered with its affiliate debtors‘ cases), coders used
information listed in the lead debtor‘s schedules of assets and liabilities. Accordingly, if the lead
debtor did not file consolidated schedules, the coded data might not reflect the full amount of
assets or liabilities. The large difference between the mean and median values is a reflection of
the influence of a few companies with extremely large assets or liabilities on the mean.
124. For consistency purposes, if a Chapter 11 case involved more than one debtor (that is,
the debtor‘s case was jointly administered with its affiliate debtors‘ cases), coders used
information listed in the lead debtor‘s statement of financial affairs. Accordingly, if the lead
debtor did not file a consolidated statement, the coded data might not reflect the full amount of
gross income.
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creditors, 19.6 percent involved 1,000 or more creditors, and 1.7
percent involved an unknown number of creditors. A Chapter 11
trustee was appointed to replace the debtor‘s management in only 2.7
percent of the cases, and an examiner was appointed in only 3.4
percent of the cases. As of the close of the data on June 30, 2010, only
4.1 percent of the cases remained pending with no resolution to the
debtor‘s reorganization efforts (that is, no plan or sale of substantially
all assets). Table 1 sets forth the resolution of the 296 cases included
in the dataset.125
Table 1: Case Resolution

Plan of reorganization confirmed
Plan of liquidation (or liquidating plan of reorganization)
confirmed
Case dismissed
Sales with no confirmed plan or conversion
Case still pending with no ultimate resolution
Sale of debtor‘s assets in chapter 11 case with no subsequent
plan and then conversion to chapter 7
Case transferred to another jurisdiction
Conversion to case to chapter 7 prior to sale of debtor‘s assets
and/or plan confirmation
Total

Frequency
(%)
117
(39.5)
77
(26.0)
72
(24.3)
13
(4.4)
12
(4.1)
2
(0.7)
2
(0.7)
1
(0.3)
296
(100.0)

B. General Committee Information
The cases in the database not only provide a representative
sample of business debtors, but also provide a fairly equal sampling of
cases in which a creditors‘ committee was appointed under section
1102 of the Bankruptcy Code (creditors‘ committees) and cases in
125. The focus of the study was not case resolution but rather the impact, if any, of creditors‘
committees on case resolution. Accordingly, Table 1 describes the outcomes of the cases included
in the database as a point of reference. These data may reflect the forum and case parameters
used in creating the database and thus should be used with caution in relation to studies
focusing solely on case outcome based on different parameters.
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which a committee was not appointed. Specifically, 143 cases (48.3
percent) involved at least one creditors‘ committee and 153 cases (51.7
percent) involved no creditors‘ committees.126 Of the cases with
creditors‘ committees, 95.8 percent had one creditors‘ committee, 2.1
percent had two creditors‘ committees, and 2.1 percent had three
creditors‘ committees.127
The database also includes information about statutory
committees of equity holders (equity committees) and ad hoc
committees of creditors or equity holders (ad hoc committees). 128
Although not the focus of the study, an active equity committee or ad
hoc committee can alter the dynamics of the Chapter 11 case. The
study captures relevant information to, among other things, control
for those factors. These data show equity committees in 2.7 percent of
the cases and active ad hoc committees in 11.1 percent of the cases.129
Although not by design, the database provided two very strong,
natural comparative categories of data—data for cases with no
committees and data for cases with committees.130 The analysis set
forth below divides these data one step further, with three
comparative categories emerging: cases with no committees (―NC‖);
cases with only one creditors‘ committee (―UCC‖);131 and cases with
multiple committees or a committee other than a creditors‘ committee
(―OC‖). A case with multiple committees may, for example, have two
official committees of creditors representing different types of
creditors‘ claims or a creditors‘ committee and an official committee of
equity holders.132 These categories result in 144 NC cases, 115 UCC

126. Overall, 152 cases (51.4%) involved some type of committee (that is, creditors‘
committee, equity committee, ad hoc committee, or some combination), leaving 144 cases (48.6%)
with no committee involvement.
127. Of the cases with creditors‘ committees in the database, the types of creditors‘
committees include general unsecured creditors (98.6%), banks and other financial institutions
(0.7%), personal injury claimants (2.1%), employees or retirees (2.8%), and other claimants
(2.1%).
128. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609,
1671–72 (discussing use of ad hoc committees to influence Chapter 11 cases and the issues
created by that practice).
129. The cases with ad hoc committees break down as follows: 63.6% involve one ad hoc
committee, 15.1% involve two ad hoc committees, and 21.2% involve three ad hoc committees.
130. The authors elected to use three categories because the dynamics and, consequently,
results can be significantly different in cases involving just one creditors‘ committee versus cases
involving multiple creditors‘ committees or different types of committees.
131. The abbreviation ―UCC‖ frequently is used as a shorthand reference for ―unsecured
creditors‘ committee‖ in the Chapter 11 context. Accordingly, that abbreviation is used to identify
the category capturing data for cases involving only one official ―unsecured creditors‘ committee.‖
132. For a discussion of the multiple committee structure, see supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
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cases, and thirty-seven OC cases.133 The phrase ―committee type‖ as
used herein refers to these three comparative categories. Appendix B
sets forth the descriptive information for each of the categories,
including size and types of business debtors, number of creditors, and
the filing jurisdictions.
C. Committee Activity
A business debtor typically uses Chapter 11 to restructure
through a plan of reorganization or a sale of substantially all of its
assets.134 A debtor also may use a plan to sell its assets or to distribute
the proceeds of sales to stakeholders.135 These plans are referred to as
liquidating plans or plans of liquidation.
When a business files a Chapter 11 case, the U.S. trustee may
appoint a creditors‘ committee to monitor the debtor and work to
increase returns to creditors.136 The creditors‘ committee may try to
achieve the latter objective through negotiating a favorable plan of
reorganization or encouraging a debtor to sell its assets on a piecemeal
or going concern basis. This Article examines the influence of
creditors‘ committees on these critical restructuring decisions in Parts
IV.C.1 and C.2, respectively. It then considers two questions directly
related to the first hypothesis: Does the presence of a creditors‘
committee facilitate a reorganization of the debtor‘s business and
increase returns to the debtor‘s creditors? Part IV.D presents data
addressing the frequency and impact of conflicts and litigation on a
133. In the OC case category, 8 cases have only ad hoc committees, 1 case has only an equity
committee, and 28 cases have some combination of committees. In certain instances, the small
sample size of this category did not allow for robust analyses, and those analyses focus on the NC
cases and UCC cases.
134. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006) (explaining sale process); id. § 1125 (listing requirements
for content of plan); id. § 1129 (detailing requirements for confirmation of plan).
135. A debtor who sells its assets in Chapter 11 has three primary options for completing its
restructuring efforts:
Chapter 11 debtors have traditionally chosen among three possible courses of action
after a sale of their assets. First, a debtor could proceed with confirmation of a
liquidating chapter 11 plan, which requires compliance with §§ 1123 and 1129. . . .
Second, a debtor could convert the chapter 11 case to a case under chapter 7 and allow
a chapter 7 trustee to distribute a debtor‘s remaining assets, if any, to creditors and to
prosecute any available avoidance actions. Third, a debtor could seek entry of a simple
order dismissing the chapter 11 case, returning the parties to their state law rights
and remedies.
Norman L. Pernick & G. David Dean, Structured Chapter 11 Dismissals: A Viable and Growing
Alternative After Asset Sales, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2010, at 1, 55–56; see also A. Joseph
Warburton, Understanding the Bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors: A Primer, 60
SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 539–41 (2010) (explaining the advantages of pursuing a section 363 sale
rather than a sale under a plan).
136. See supra Part II.A.3.
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debtor‘s Chapter 11 case, which is the focus of the second hypothesis.
Finally, the Article tests the hypotheses based on the foregoing data
analyses in Part V.E.
1. The Plan Process
The Bankruptcy Code sets forth the requirements for
confirming (that is, obtaining court approval of) a plan of
reorganization or liquidation.137 Among other things, section 1129
requires that the plan comply with the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, be proposed in good faith, make disclosures regarding payments
under the plan, and be accepted by at least one class of impaired
claims.138 A claim is considered impaired unless the plan ―leaves
unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to which such
claim . . . entitles the holder.‖139 Holders of impaired claims and
interests under the proposed plan typically are entitled to vote on
whether to accept or reject the plan.140
A debtor may start negotiating its plan with key stakeholders
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case. If the debtor achieves a
consensus on a plan during this prepetition period, the case usually
involves a prepackaged or pre-arranged plan, and it proceeds quicker
than a free-fall (that is, no prenegotiated plan) case.141 Otherwise, a
debtor will negotiate its plan during the course of the Chapter 11 case
with its stakeholders, including any creditors‘ or equity committees.
Ad hoc committees also may get a seat at the negotiating table.142
The Bankruptcy Code provides the debtor with an exclusive
period to file and solicit votes on its plan for the first 120 and 180 days
of the case, respectively.143 Under amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code implemented in 2005, the bankruptcy court may extend the
137. § 1129 (detailing requirements for confirmation of plan).
138. Id.
139. Id. § 1124(1) (explaining impairment of claims and interests under plan).
140. Id. § 1126 (explaining voting procedures relating to Chapter 11 plans). Under section
1126, holders of unimpaired claims and interests are deemed to accept the plan, and holders of
claims and interests who do not receive any distributions under the plan are deemed to reject it.
Id. § 1126(f)–(g).
141. See, e.g., John D. Ayer et al., Out-of-Court Workouts, Prepacks and Pre-Arranged Cases:
A Primer, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2005, at 16, 16–17 (discussing details of prepackaged and
pre-arranged Chapter 11 cases); see also § 1125(g) (allowing a debtor to solicit acceptance of a
plan prior to filing its Chapter 11 petition under certain circumstances).
142. See, e.g., Carrianne Basler & Michelle Campbell, Savvy Claims Purchasers Must Avoid
Pitfalls, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2006, at 26, 26 (explaining use of ad hoc committee to
participate in plan negotiations).
143. § 1121(d) (setting forth deadlines relating to the filing and solicitation of acceptances of
plan).
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debtor‘s exclusivity period for not more than eighteen and twenty
months, respectively, from the petition date.144 This amendment
altered prior practice, which allowed bankruptcy courts to continue to
extend the debtor‘s exclusive periods for cause indefinitely.145
Analysis of the case database reveals that the plan process
differs among the three committee types. First, this Section considers
the overall case duration and the duration between the case filing and
plan confirmation. Second, it discusses creditors‘ committee and
noncommittee objections to the debtor‘s plans.
a. Case Duration
Of the 296 cases in the database, the debtor filed a plan in 236
of the cases—109 NC cases, ninety UCC cases, and thirty-seven OC
cases. The bankruptcy court confirmed plans in 199 of these cases.
Although, overall, NC cases are significantly shorter in duration than
UCC cases (p=.001), no significant differences emerged among the
three categories with respect to the time elapsing between the filing of
the case and confirmation of a plan.146
Table 2: Predicted Case Durations (in days)

NC
UCC
OC

Filing of Case to
Case Closure
699
1193
1076

Filing of Case to
Plan Confirmation
424
472
482

144. NC cases are significantly less likely than UCC cases (p < .001) and OC cases (p < .001)
to have more than one request by the debtor to extend its exclusive periods under section 1121.
145. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Schlerf, BAPCPA’s Impact on Exclusivity is Hard to Gauge, J.
CORP. RENEWAL, July 1, 2007, available at http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx
?objectID=7797 (explaining possibility of unlimited extensions of exclusivity prior to the
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and observing that ―[m]ost courts routinely granted an
initial extension in the early stages of a case and were inclined to grant further extensions if a
debtor demonstrated that it was making sufficient progress in the formulation of a Chapter 11
plan‖).
146. Analysis based on negative binomial regressions. Overall case duration was calculated
from the petition date (filing of the case) through the date that the case was closed. Only 189 of
the 296 cases have been officially closed by order of the bankruptcy court. Accordingly, this
analysis is based on 189 cases. This pattern is not observed in the Central District of California,
where the average duration for the 11 NC cases is 1,111 days and the average duration for the 3
UCC cases is 998. In addition, no significant difference emerged in overall duration with respect
to the OC cases, which may be due to insufficient power.
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b. Objections to Plan
Creditors‘ committees rarely filed objections or pleadings
relating to the debtor‘s plan. As discussed above, a creditors‘
committee is empowered by the Bankruptcy Code to engage with the
debtor in plan negotiations.147 Bankruptcy court dockets typically do
not reflect negotiations, but parties may file objections or other
pleadings in the Chapter 11 case to obtain leverage in the
negotiations. Interestingly, creditors‘ committees filed one or more
objections or pleadings relating to the debtor‘s plan in only fourteen
cases. This finding corresponds to prior studies suggesting a lack of
meaningful activity by creditors‘ committees in Chapter 11 cases.148
The finding does not reflect off-docket activity, however, and as such,
it should be considered in light of other findings regarding case
resolution and creditors‘ recoveries.149
Moreover, when analyzing committee objections in the UCC
case and OC case categories, OC cases are significantly more likely to
have a plan objection filed by the creditors‘ committee than UCC cases
(p=.019).150 This finding corresponds to the notion that committees use
formal objections to achieve greater bargaining power in negotiations,
which may be more contentious in cases involving multiple
committees.
The appointment or appearance of one or more committees in a
case likely reflects increased creditor interest in the case. The plan
objection data support this. For example, OC cases are significantly
more likely than NC cases (p<.001) and UCC cases (p=.001) to have
plan objections filed by stakeholders other than a committee.151

147. See § 1103(c) (listing powers of statutory committees); see also supra Part II.A.
148. See supra Part II.C.
149. See infra Parts IV.C.3–4 (discussing findings on reorganization as compared to
liquidation and on the effects of committees on unsecured creditors).
150. Analysis based on logistic regression. Furthermore, this pattern is observed in all
forums. Although sample size did not permit separate analysis, equity committees filed plan
objections in 4 of the 8 cases with a plan and an equity committee. Ad hoc committees filed plan
objections in 12 of the 33 cases with a plan and an ad hoc committee.
151. This pattern is not observed in the Central District of California where UCC cases are
more likely than OC cases to have such a plan. OC cases also are significantly more likely than
UCC cases (p = .006) and NC cases (p = .021) to involve a prepackaged or pre-arranged plan. This
pattern is not observed in the District of Delaware where a greater percentage of NC cases
involve a prepacked or pre-arranged plan than do OC cases; however, a greater percentage of OC
cases involve a prepackaged or pre-arranged plan than do UCC cases. This pattern is also not
observed in the Northern District of Illinois where a greater percentage of NC cases involve such
a plan than UCC and OC cases; there is no difference between UCC and OC cases in that
jurisdiction.
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Likewise, UCC cases are significantly more likely than NC cases
(p=.008) to have noncommittee plan objections.152
2. The Sale Process
Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor, after
notice and a hearing, to ―use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary
course of business, property of the estate.‖153 Debtors invoke this
section to sell a portion or substantially all of their assets to a third
party. Purchasers often are enticed to buy a debtor‘s assets in
bankruptcy because section 363(f) permits the debtor to sell its assets
under certain specified circumstances free and clear of all claims,
liens, or encumbrances asserted against the debtor or its assets.154
Some practitioners and commentators have suggested that debtors no
longer reorganize under Chapter 11; rather, they simply use the
process to sell assets under the special protections of section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code.155
Analysis of the case database reveals that the sale process
differs among the three committee types. The following analysis
considers motions to sell assets (including whether an auction process
was used), objections to the sale motions, and ultimate approvals of
the sale motions.
a. Motions to Sell Assets
Debtors filed motions to sell substantially all of their assets in
ninety-nine of the 296 cases in the database—twenty-seven NC cases,
sixty-seven UCC cases, and five OC cases. UCC cases are significantly
more likely than NC cases (p<.001) and OC cases (p<.001) to involve a

152. This pattern is observed in all forums.
153. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006) (setting forth requirements for sales outside the ordinary
course of business).
154. Id. § 363(f) (authorizing sales ―free and clear of any interest in such property‖ if one of
five conditions is met). For a thoughtful exploration of section 363(f) and an argument that it is
applied too broadly, see George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and
Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235 (2002).
155. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 751, 751–52 (2002) (discussing the trend of resolving Chapter 11 cases through the sale,
rather than plan, process and increased creditor control in that context); see also Kuney, supra
note 154, at 272 (―The courts‘ inclusion of ‗claims‘ within ‗interests‘ under § 363(f) and the erosion
of the bias against preplan sales of substantial groups of assets has led to the use of Chapter 11
to achieve a prenegotiated sale of a business or group of assets and to protect the buyer from
successor liability.‖); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L.
REV. 129, 129 (2005) (discussing the trend and similar issues).
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motion to sell substantially all of the debtor‘s assets.156 This finding
may suggest that active creditors‘ committees encourage a sale rather
than reorganization of the debtor‘s business in Chapter 11. It would be
consistent with observed trends regarding increased activity by
distressed debt investors, both on committees and in their individual
capacities, who typically have short-term objectives and investment
horizons. Because this finding may have significant import for
Chapter 11 policy, it is analyzed further below in connection with
liquidating plans and the parties participating in the Chapter 11
case.157
b. Auction Process
Although not technically required by section 363, debtors may
use an auction process to market and sell their assets.158 An auction
process can help ensure that the debtor receives the best or highest
offer for the assets.159 UCC cases are significantly more likely to
involve an auction process than NC cases (p=.003).160

156. Analysis based on logistic regression. This pattern is not observed in the District of
Maryland where 1 of the 7 (14.3%) UCC cases has a filed motion while 4 of 13 (30.8%) of NC
cases has a filed motion.
157. See infra Part IV.C.3.
158. Section 363(b) technically requires only ―notice and a hearing.‖ § 363(b); see also FED.
R. BANKR. P. 2002 (setting forth notice and disclosure requirements in the context of a sale). In
general, a bankruptcy court will approve the section 363(b) sale if the debtor demonstrates sound
business justifications for the sale. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 117–18 (2d Cir.
2009) (explaining that ―the sale of an asset of the estate under § 363(b) is permissible if the
‗judge determining [the] §363(b) application expressly find[s] from the evidence presented before
[him or her] at the hearing [that there is] a good business reason to grant such an application‘ ‖)
(quoting In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2d Cir. 2007)); see also Stephens
Indus., Inc. v. Mallory Co., Inc., 789 F.2d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 1986) (explaining standard); Comm.
of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983)
(―The rule we adopt requires that a judge determining a § 363(b) application expressly find from
the evidence presented before him at the hearing a good business reason to grant such an
application.‖); In re Montgomery Ward, 242 B.R. 147, 153–54 (D. Del. 1999) (listing factors to be
considered in determination).
159. See, e.g., Marshall Huebner & Rajesh James, Duties and Obligations of Officers and
Directors in § 363 Sales, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2009/Jan. 2010, at 36, 36 (―[O]nce the decision
has been made to sell discrete assets or the enterprise under § 363, the debtor‘s obligation is to
maximize the estate‘s value by soliciting and accepting the ‗highest and best‘ available bid.‖).
160. This pattern is not observed in the District of Delaware where 29 of 35 (82.9%) of UCC
cases involve an auction process and 3 of 3 (100%) of NC cases involve an auction process.
Similarly, this pattern is not observed in the Northern District of Ohio where 4 of 5 (80%) of UCC
cases involve an auction process and 2 of 2 (100%) of NC cases involve an auction process.
Finally, this pattern is also not observed in the District of Maryland where 0 of 1 (zero percent)
of UCC cases and 1 of 4 (twenty-five percent) of NC cases involve such a process.
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c. Objections to Sale Motions
Similar to the plan process, a committee may use an objection
to a proposed sale to affect negotiations with the debtor or the
potential purchaser. Of the seventy-one cases involving a sale motion
and a creditors‘ committee, the committee filed objections or other
pleadings relating to the sale in only nineteen of the cases.161 UCC
cases are significantly more likely than NC cases (p=.016), however, to
have sale objections filed by noncommittee parties, again indicating
increased stakeholder activity in committee cases.162 As discussed
above, the lack of committee activity represented by these findings
must be considered in connection with other findings and the survey
data collected from Chapter 11 professionals and committee
members.163
No significant differences emerged in whether the court
ultimately approved the sale motion, but the duration between the
filing of the sale motion and approval of the sale is significantly longer
in NC cases as compared to UCC cases (p=.026).164 The bankruptcy
court may take more time to consider and approve sales in NC cases
because there is no formal oversight by a committee and typically no
auction process.165 Debtors in NC cases also may require more time to
negotiate on an individual basis with all key stakeholders.166
Nevertheless, because many NC cases have a concentrated group of
creditors (or even a single large creditor), the shorter duration of sales
in UCC cases may result from pressure by the stakeholders, including
the committee in some cases, to consummate a sale quickly.167

161. Ad hoc committees filed sale objections in 3 of the 5 cases with a sale and an ad hoc
committee. No cases involved a sale motion and an equity committee.
162. This pattern is not observed in the District of Maryland where the 1 UCC case had no
such objections and 3 of the 4 (75%) NC cases did have such an objection. This pattern is not
observed in the Central District of California where 2 of the 3 (66.7%) UCC cases involved such
an objection and all 3 of the NC cases (100%) did involve such an objection.
163. See supra Part IV.C.1.
164. This pattern is not observed in the Southern District of New York where the average
duration of NC cases is 30.33 days and the average duration for UCC cases is 33.80 days.
165. See data supra note 160 for approval of an auction process in NC cases; see also
Warburton, supra note 135, at 559 (positing that ―courts are reluctant to disturb a sale at
auction, [which makes] the adoption of the bidding procedures . . . strategically important‖).
166. See, e.g., Baird & Bris, supra note 95, at 25 (―The need to resolve tax obligations is the
engine that drives the typical small chapter 11 case.‖).
167. For example, some commentators have complained that the quick sales requested in
the General Motors and Chrysler cases were facilitated by pressure from certain creditors. See,
e.g., John Blakeley, Lehman, Chrysler, GM: The Fallout, DEAL MAG., Aug. 7, 2009, available at
http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/029091/features/lehman,-chrysler,-gm-the-fallout.php (―‗In
GM, the need for speed was contrived in order to oppress creditor rights. And absent some
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3. Reorganization Versus Liquidation
The two preceding Sections focus on whether a debtor
reorganizes its business or sells its assets in the Chapter 11 case and a
creditors‘ committee‘s role in that decisionmaking process.168 This
analysis captures only part of the story. Further analysis into the
ultimate resolution of the Chapter 11 case is necessary to test the first
hypothesis. That analysis follows and will help determine if UCC
cases are likely to foster more overall liquidations or simply more
section 363 sales, as indicated in Part IV.B.2.
a. Impact of Committee on Case Resolution
Overall, the bankruptcy courts confirmed plans of
reorganization in 60.3 percent of the cases and plans of liquidation in
39.7 percent of the cases in the database with confirmed plans.169 The
predicted probabilities that NC cases, UCC cases, and OC cases would
have a confirmed plan of liquidation (rather than a confirmed plan of
reorganization) are .29, .63, and .14, respectively. Accordingly, UCC
cases are significantly more likely than NC cases (p<.001) and OC
cases (p<.001) to involve a confirmed plan of liquidation.170
b. Potential Confounding Factors
The preference for liquidations over reorganizations may not
stem solely from the desires or conduct of creditors‘ committees. Other
factors, such as the size of the case, the number of creditors, and the
involvement of any secured creditors, also may influence that result.
To that end, candidate control variables included number of creditors,
approval of DIP financing, assets, liabilities, and secured claims. Due
to the nature of the coding scheme, number of creditors was
dichotomized to differentiate between cases with zero to forty-nine

clarification of [Section] 363, this could always be the case.‘ ‖ (quoting counsel to a group of GM
bondholders)).
168. See supra Part IV.C.2.
169. This analysis includes 194 confirmed plans, which differs slightly from the total of 199
confirmed plans used to consider the duration of cases from filing to confirmation in Part IV.C.1
above. This difference results from the exclusion of five cases that were dismissed after
confirmation of the plan because of the debtor‘s nonpayment or other defaults on
postconfirmation obligations. These five cases represent the only postconfirmation dismissals in
the database.
170. This pattern is not observed in the District of Maryland where 2 of the 6 (33.3%) UCC
cases involve a confirmed plan of liquidation while 3 of the 6 (50%) NC cases involve a confirmed
plan of reorganization.
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creditors and cases with fifty or more creditors171 Assets, liabilities,
and secured claims were dichotomized based on each variable‘s
median. The meaning of such categorization reflects the effect of being
above or below the median on assets, liabilities, or secured claims.
Following Hosmer and Lemeshow‘s model-building strategies,
candidate control variables were included in the final multivariate
model when they had a bivariate relationship with the outcome
variable (here, liquidation versus reorganization) at the p=.25
significance level.172 All candidate control variables, with the
exception of number of creditors, met this criterion; however, assets,
liabilities, and secured claims were highly correlated and thus only
the asset category was retained. In a model controlling for DIP
financing and assets, the effect remained significant.173
4. Creditors‘ Recoveries
The dual goals of Chapter 11 are rehabilitation and
maximizing returns to creditors.174 The discussion above focuses on
the rehabilitation versus liquidation objective. This Section considers
returns to unsecured creditors and whether a committee affects the
amount of those returns, which again informs analysis of the first
hypothesis.175

171. Number of creditors was measured using an eleven-point scale with ten category
ranges (for example, 1–49, 50–99, 100–199) and an ―unknown‖ category. This dichotomy was
selected because it most closely approximates this variable‘s median. Of the 291 cases reporting
number of creditors, 45% (n = 131) reported 99 or fewer creditors while the remaining 55% (n =
161) reported 50 or more creditors.
172. DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION (2d ed.
2000).
173. See infra Appendix C, Table 2. Also, as discussed previously, ―committee type‖ refers to
the categories of no committee (NC cases), single creditors‘ committee (UCC cases) and multiple
or other committee cases (OC cases) used for comparative purposes. See supra Part IV.B. In the
database, 194 cases involve a plan of reorganization or liquidation of which 189 have information
on all covariates. Therefore, these analyses are based on 189 cases.
174. See H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179
(―The purpose of a business reorganization case [under Chapter 11] . . . is to restructure a
business‘s finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its
creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders.‖); S. REP. NO. 95–989, at 10 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5796 (discussing dual goals of legislation); see also Toibb v. Radloff,
501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991) (discussing traditional dual goals of Chapter 11); Warren, supra
note 40, at 340 (same).
175. The phrase ―general unsecured creditors‖ refers to creditors classified as ―general
unsecured‖ under the plan or distribution order filed in the debtor‘s case. This class typically
represents the beneficiaries of the creditors‘ committee. Coders also were instructed to code
separately information for other classes of unsecured creditors. The analyses in this Part discuss
results based on all coded categories of unsecured creditors. This approach provided a broader
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Creditors‘ committees and their members are fiduciaries for
creditors holding unsecured claims.176 Accordingly, their conduct in
the Chapter 11 case should aim to increase the percentage recovery
received by unsecured creditors. Admittedly, a variety of factors may
influence creditor returns. Nevertheless, regression analyses provide
meaningful insight into committees‘ impact on creditors‘ recoveries.
Analysis of the case database reveals differences in recoveries
among committee types and between plan confirmation types. First,
this Section considers the return to creditors in all cases. Second, it
discusses the return to creditors in UCC cases only. Again, a variety of
case characteristics apart from committee type may influence
creditors‘ recoveries and thus this Section also presents multivariate
analyses.
a. All Cases
Of the 296 cases, 238 cases have valid information for
percentage recoveries to unsecured creditors.177 The data show the
following overall returns to unsecured creditors: 1.7 percent of the
cases had no recovery; 0.7 percent had less than one percent recovery;
14.9 percent had one to ten percent recovery; 8.4 percent had eleven to
twenty-five percent recovery; 5.1 percent had twenty-six to fifty
percent recovery; 2.7 percent had fifty-one to seventy-five percent
recovery; and 22.6 percent had seventy-six to one hundred percent
recovery. An analysis of the median percentage recovery for unsecured
creditors reveals that unsecured creditors in half of the cases in the
case database received twenty-five percent or less of their claim value
and unsecured creditors in the other half received more than twentyfive percent of their claim value.
To analyze creditors‘ recoveries by categories, the data were
collapsed
into two percentage groups—creditors
receiving
distributions equal to fifty percent or less of their claim and those
receiving more than fifty percent. Unsecured creditors in UCC cases
are significantly less likely than those in NC cases (p=.007) and OC
perspective on the treatment of unsecured creditors in the cases. Nevertheless, similar results
emerged based on analyses of the general unsecured creditors class.
176. See supra Part II.A.3.
177. Coders were instructed to record the percentage recovery listed in the debtor‘s
disclosure statement or the distribution order for, among others, the class of general unsecured
creditors. The 58 cases without valid information for this variable involve cases that did not
reflect this information on the docket, including cases that were dismissed or converted prior to
any plan or distribution order. In addition, in 72 cases, the disclosure statement or other
disclosure of recoveries to unsecured creditors listed the percentage recovery as ―unknown.‖
Accordingly, the analyses are based on the 166 cases with known percentage recoveries.
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cases (p≤.001) to receive a distribution representing more than fifty
percent of their claims.178 There is a marginally significant difference
between NC and OC cases (p=.004). In a model controlling for DIP
financing and assets, the effects remained the same with the exception
of the marginal difference between NC and OC cases which
disappeared (p=.634).179
The finding that unsecured creditors do better in OC cases
than in UCC cases corresponds with the notion that there is more
value, and thus more to fight about, in cases involving more than one
committee. Those cases tend to be larger in overall size and affected
creditors.180 In addition, equity committees typically are appointed
only if there is some suggestion that the debtor‘s enterprise value is
sufficient to pay all creditors in full and thus leave some value for
shareholders.181 Nevertheless, the data suggest that creditors might
benefit if parties were more open to multiple committees in the
appropriate Chapter 11 cases.182
b. UCC Cases Only
Focusing solely on the UCC cases, unsecured creditors are
significantly (p<.001) more likely to receive larger percentage
178. Analysis based on logistic regression. This pattern is not observed in the District of
Maryland where 1 of the 3 (33.3%) of the UCC cases receive a distribution representing more
than 50% of their claim, while 0 of the 3 (0%) NC cases receive a distribution representing more
than 50% of their claim. In the database, 166 cases have information on percentage recovery to
unsecured creditors of which 162 have information on all covariates. Therefore, these analyses
are based on 162 cases.
179. See supra Part IV.C.3; see also infra Appendix C, Table 1.
180. See Kurt F. Gwynne, Intra-committee Conflicts, Multiple Creditors’ Committees,
Altering Committee Membership and Other Alternatives for Ensuring Adequate Representation
Under Section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 109, 115–18 (2006)
(discussing the factors relevant to the appointment of multiple committees).
181. See id. at 134 (―One of the main factors in decisions refusing to order the appointment
of an additional committee is the expense associated with the additional committee.‖).
182. Consider the following observation:
Thus, despite the legislative history that seems to encourage the appointment of
multiple committees in large cases, ―Bankruptcy Courts generally have been reluctant
to [order the appointment of] separate committees of unsecured creditors
notwithstanding the diverse and sometimes conflicting interest of such creditors in
the context of a Chapter 11 proceeding.‖ This is particularly troublesome where
creditors on the committee have not only different financial motivations, but also
claims entitled to different legal priorities. For example, employee claims might be
entitled to priority under Bankruptcy Code section 507(a)(3), whereas nonpecuniary
loss penalty claims might be subordinated.
Klee & Shaffer, supra note 2, at 1025 (citations omitted). But see Gwynne, supra note 180, at
134–35 (discussing costs associated with multiple committees). Parties must weigh the costs
(including conflicts) and benefits to multiple committees, as intracommittee litigation was filed
in 25 of the database cases.
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distributions (that is, distributions in excess of fifty percent) in
reorganization cases as opposed to liquidation cases.183 This finding
suggests that reorganization cases hold more value for unsecured
creditors. The data show the same finding for unsecured creditors in
all cases.184
D. Conflicts and Litigation Involving Committees
As suggested in the discussion of multiple committees above,
increased creditor activity in Chapter 11 cases may be beneficial, but
it also presents certain risks. For example, conflicts can develop either
pre- or postpetition among various creditors or creditor groups, and
creditors‘ engagement in the process may result in self-dealing
behavior. This Section considers the prevalence of creditors‘ committee
conflicts in Chapter 11 cases and the impact of those conflicts on
entity value. These data inform the analysis of the second hypothesis.
1. Potential Conflicts
Detecting potential conflicts of interest in Chapter 11 cases can
be challenging. Other than the debtor and certain professionals, most
parties in interest have no obligation to disclose their relationships
with, various claims against, or interests in the debtor, its insiders, or
its competitors.185 Consequently, the parties and their pleadings often
183. This analysis is based on 52 cases with a confirmed plan or approved sale motion, a
known percentage payment and one creditors‘ committee. This pattern is not observed in the
Southern District of New York where 40% of both reorganizing and liquidating cases result in a
percentage distribution exceeding 50% (there are 5 cases in each category).
184. Of the 138 cases with a confirmed plan or approved sale motion and a known
percentage payment, 65.2% involved plans of reorganization and 34.8% involved liquidation. The
data show creditors in 56.7% of reorganizations receiving greater than 50% and receiving the
same level of distribution in only 29.2% of the liquidation cases. Thus, there is a significant effect
of plan type such that reorganizations are significantly more likely than liquidations (p = .002) to
receive distributions in excess of 50%. Furthermore, this pattern is observed in all forums. For
example:
The premise of the Railroad Equity Receiverships—that a reorganized financial entity
will realize more value as a going concern than through its liquidation—has remained
unchanged despite four extensive amendments to the Bankruptcy Reform Act and a
comprehensive review of the operation of the Bankruptcy Reform Act by the National
Bankruptcy Commission appointed in 1996.
Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option
for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 190 (2004).
185. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 327 (2006) (discussing professionals in bankruptcy cases); id. §
1107 (discussing debtors in possession); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007 (outlining debtor‘s financial and
other disclosure obligations); id. r. 2016 (discussing disclosures for professionals seeking
compensation in case); id. r. 2019 (discussing lawyers representing multiple parties in interest);
see also supra Part II.A.3. The scope of disclosures under Bankruptcy Rule 2019 is often
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fail to detect many conflicts in the Chapter 11 case. The data results
are limited in this respect, as they only reflect conflicts or potential
conflicts that were discernible from the docket. The data thus are
likely underinclusive.
Nevertheless, at least one member of the creditors‘ committee
held some interest or asserted some position that presented a
potential conflict in thirty-five percent of the database cases with
creditors‘ committees. The U.S. trustee and the bankruptcy courts
confronted some of the conflicts on a regular basis and typically
deemed them not detrimental to a party‘s service on the committee.186
Examples of these conflicts include indenture trustees and parties to
contracts and leases with the debtor. Some of the conflicts were more
unique, however, and raise concerns. Examples of these conflicts
include members who held both secured and unsecured debt, held both
equity and unsecured debt, or were controlled by alleged insiders of
the debtor.
2. Litigation by Committee Members and the Committee
Disputes and resulting litigation also can represent a conflict of
interest or an agenda different than general unsecured creditors or
the other members of the creditors‘ committee. This type of activity
can signify creditor interest in the debtor‘s restructuring, which
Congress sought to increase in structuring the Bankruptcy Code to
benefit all stakeholders in the Chapter 11 process. Accordingly, the
study evaluated key pleadings filed in the Chapter 11 case by
creditors‘ committees and their members.
In some cases, members of the creditors‘ committee did not rely
on the committee to file pleadings representative of its position. For
example, individual committee members filed objections to: the
proposed DIP financing in fifteen cases (fifteen percent of creditors‘
committee cases with a filed DIP motion); the sale motion in nineteen
cases (twenty-seven percent of creditors‘ committee cases with a filed
sale motion); the disclosure statement in fifteen cases (thirteen
percent of creditors‘ committee cases with a filed disclosure
statement); and the plan in twelve cases (ten percent of creditors‘

contested, particularly in the context of a lawyer representing an ad hoc committee. See, e.g.,
George R. Mesires, Continued Uncertainty over Rule 2019 May Chill Participation of Distressed
Investors, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2010, at 1, 1 (explaining debate concerning Rule 2019 and
split among bankruptcy court decisions).
186. See Gwynne, supra note 180, at 120–29 (discussing types and treatment of committee
members‘ conflicts).
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committee cases with a filed plan).187 The data show that individual
members are significantly more likely to file an objection to a plan
(p<.001) when the committee also files an objection.188
One or more committees also filed objections and pleadings in
relation to activities by key players in the Chapter 11 cases, in
addition to those committee objections discussed in Part IV.C. Among
others, committees filed an objection to the secured creditors‘
prepetition claims in 43.4 percent of the database cases involving
creditors‘ committees.189 Moreover, they filed an objection or other
pleading opposing the debtor‘s conduct in sixty-seven percent of the
database cases involving creditors‘ committees.190 The latter finding
lends some support to the role of the committee as a statutory
watchdog or supervisor of the debtor‘s conduct.191
3. Impact of Conflicts and Litigation on Value
Conflicts and competition are innate to the Chapter 11
process—a process designed to aggregate and resolve, often by
compromising a party‘s position, all claims and interests asserted
against a debtor‘s limited pool of resources. The goal should not be
eliminating conflicts and competition; rather, the focus should be on
aligning these characteristics with value maximization. This goal
187. Some cases involved more than one type of objection by individual members. Overall,
98 cases (68% of creditors‘ committee cases) did not involve an individual creditors‘ committee
member objection to the proposed DIP financing, sale motion, disclosure statement or plan.
188. Individuals filed objections to the plan in 7 of the 104 (6.7%) cases in which committees
did not file an objection and in 5 of the 14 (35.7%) cases in which committees did file an objection.
The effect is significant (p < .001), indicating that individuals are more likely to file an objection
to the plan when the committee also files an objection to the plan. Individuals filed objections to
the DIP motion in 5 of the 46 (10.9%) cases in which committees did not file an objection and in
10 of the 51 (19.6%) cases in which committees did file an objection. The effect is not significant
(p = .235), indicating that whether or not individuals file an objection to the DIP motion does not
depend on whether or not the committee files an objection. Individuals filed objections to the sale
motion in 15 of the 52 (28.8%) cases in which committees did not file an objection and in 4 of the
19 (21.1%) cases in which committees did file an objection. The effect is not significant (p = .511),
indicating that whether or not individuals file an objection to the sale motion does not depend on
whether or not the committee files an objection. Individuals filed objections to the disclosure
statement in 10 of the 92 (10.9%) cases in which committees did not file an objection and in 5 of
the 23 (21.7%) cases in which committees did file an objection. The effect is not significant (p =
.166), indicating that whether or not individuals file an objection to the disclosure statement
does not depend on whether or not the committee files an objection. Interpret results with some
caution due to one insufficient cell size. Also, this pattern is observed in all forums.
189. Committees filed an objection to the secured creditors‘ prepetition claims in 41% of
UCC cases.
190. Committees filed an objection or other pleading opposing the debtor‘s conduct in 60% of
UCC cases.
191. See supra Part II.A.3.
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requires an understanding of the impact of the various potential
conflicts and disputes recorded in the database.
Interestingly, analysis of the case database reveals that neither
the presence of conflict nor litigation has a significant effect on
whether a debtor reorganizes or liquidates192 or on the percentage
recovery received by general unsecured creditors.193 Cases with these
characteristics do, however, evidence adverse consequences for the
estate and the debtor‘s stakeholders. For example, the estate incurred
significantly greater costs relating to committees‘ professional fees
and expenses in cases involving conflicts of interest by a member of
the creditors‘ committee or committee litigation against secured
lenders or the debtor.194 Moreover, cases involving committee
192. A conflicting interest was held by at least one creditors‘ committee member in 44 of the
104 cases involving creditors‘ committees and plans of reorganization or liquidation; 51.7% of
cases with no conflict involved plans of liquidation, while 43.2% of cases with a conflict involved
plans of liquidation. There is no significant effect of conflicting interest on whether the debtor
confirms plan of reorganization or liquidates (p = .392). Committee litigation against secured
creditors occurred in 22 cases; 37.8% of cases with no such litigation involved plans of liquidation
while 54.5% of cases with litigation involved plans of liquidation. There is no significant effect of
litigation on whether the debtor confirms plan of reorganization or liquidates (p = .130).
Committee litigation against the debtor occurred in 77 cases; 35.2% of cases with no such
litigation involved plans of liquidation while 47.2% of cases with litigation involved plans of
liquidation. There is no significant effect of litigation on whether the debtor confirms plan of
reorganization or liquidates (p = .100).
193. Of the 82 cases with a creditors‘ committee and information about percentage
recoveries to general unsecured creditors, 25% of cases with a creditors‘ committee and no
conflict provided distributions to general unsecured creditors in excess of 50%, while 34.2% of
cases with a conflict provided like distributions. There is no significant effect of conflicting
interest on whether or not the payment percentage exceeds 50% (p = .361). Similarly, 42.6% of
cases with no creditors‘ committee litigation against secured creditors provided distributions to
general unsecured creditors in excess of 50%, while 33.3% of cases with such litigation provided
like distributions. There is no significant effect of litigation on whether or not the payment
percentage exceeds 50% (p = .315). Finally, 45.4% of cases with no creditors‘ committee litigation
against the debtor provided distributions to general unsecured creditors in excess of 50%, while
31.6% of cases with such litigation provided like distributions. There is no significant effect of
conflicting interest on whether or not the payment percentage exceeds 50% (p = .086).
194. Of cases with at least one creditors‘ committee and a committee member conflict, 103
included information about committees‘ professional fees and expenses. Forty-three (41.7%) of
these cases involved conflicting interest, while 60 (58.3%) did not. The predicted total costs of
cases with and without conflicting interest are $9,655,131 and $1,126,921, respectively. There is
a significant effect of conflicting interest on total cost such that cases with a conflicting interest
have a significantly greater total cost than cases with no conflicting interest (p < .001). This
pattern is observed in all forums. Of cases involving any committee litigation against secured
creditors, 106 included information about committees‘ professional fees and expenses. Fortyeight (45.3%) of these cases involved litigation against secured creditors while 58 (54.7%) did not.
The predicted total costs of cases with and without such litigation are $7,145,548 and $2,540,827,
respectively. There is a significant effect of litigation against secured creditors on total cost such
that cases with litigation against secured creditors have a significantly greater total cost than
cases with no such litigation (p < .001). This pattern is not observed in the District of Delaware,
the Central District of California or the Northern District of Ohio where cases with no such
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litigation against the debtor are significantly longer than cases
without such litigation (p=.011).195
Overall, the data suggest that conflicts of interest and
litigation involving creditors‘ committees are expensive distractions
but otherwise do not impact entity value.196 It certainly is plausible
that the effects of known conflicts and disputes are neutralized by
their public disclosure. Armed with information regarding conflicts
and disputes, parties can take appropriate steps to protect their
interests. The problem, if any, may be the unknown or nonpublic
influences and disputes.
In this respect, the absence of a strong association between
conflicts or litigation and certain outcomes in the Chapter 11 case
focuses the analysis of the creditors‘ committee role. If conflicts or
litigation do not affect value, what characteristics of the committee
structure might contribute to the findings in Part IV.C? Part V
explores this question and proposes possible explanations and
solutions.
E. Testing the Hypotheses
The data provide valuable insights into the operation of
Chapter 11 cases and the conduct of creditors‘ committees. The
descriptive data help explain what is occurring in Chapter 11 cases,
and the various regression analyses help predict what might occur in

litigation result in greater costs than cases with such litigation. Of cases involving any
committee litigation against the debtor, 106 included information about committees‘ professional
fees and expenses. Seventy-eight (73.6%) of these cases involved litigation against the debtor
while 28 (26.4%) did not. The predicted total costs of cases with and without such litigation are
$5,980,412 and $843,234, respectively. There is a significant effect of litigation against the
debtor on total cost such that cases with such litigation have a significantly greater total cost
than cases with no such litigation (p < .001).
195. Of cases involving any committee litigation against the debtor, 187 included case
duration information (i.e., time elapsed between petition date and date case closed). One
hundred forty-five (77.5%) of these cases did not involve such litigation while 42 (22.5%) did
involve such litigation. The predicted durations of cases with and without such litigation are
1,240 days and 794 days, respectively. There is a significant effect of litigation against the debtor
on case duration (petition to close) such that cases with such litigation are significantly longer
than cases without such litigation (p = .011). This pattern is observed in all forums. These
analyses did not include the two cases in the database that were transferred to a jurisdiction not
included in the study.
196. The most popular related responses to the professionals and committee member
surveys indicate that conflicts either increase or do not impact the amount of creditors‘
recoveries, with more respondents perceiving increases.
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future cases. As discussed below, the data also lend support for
rejecting the primary hypotheses.197
It is important to note that cases were not randomly assigned
to a particular committee type (for example, no committee, one
creditors‘ committee only, some combination of committees); rather, it
is likely (and probably certainly) the case that the various committee
types were attracted to cases with a certain set of characteristics. For
example, cases with few assets may not attract any committee
activity. As mentioned previously, this selection effect (of committee
types to cases) was addressed by considering a variety of control
variables in the key analyses testing the first hypothesis.198 In theory,
it is difficult to account for all possible confounding variables because
it may be the case that the substantive literature has yet to define
them. That being said, substantively relevant confounds that were
included in the coding scheme were thoroughly examined. Future
research may identify and control for other potential confounds not
addressed here.
1. Hypothesis No. 1: Committees Add Value
This hypothesis asserts that creditors‘ committees add value to
Chapter 11 cases, as determined by returns to unsecured creditors and
company reorganizations. As discussed in Part IV.C, the data show
that UCC cases are significantly less likely than NC cases and OC
cases to provide returns to unsecured creditors in excess of fifty
percent.199 Moreover, UCC cases are significantly more likely than NC
cases and OC cases to resolve through a liquidation, rather than
reorganization, of the debtor.200 As such, the data tend to support
rejecting the hypothesis.
As discussed in Part V, creditors‘ committees may add value to
cases not reflected on the docket or in the data. For example, a twentyfive percent recovery is better than a ten percent recovery, and the
committee might be responsible for creating or extracting that value
for unsecured creditors. The data do, however, provide reason to

197. The authors recognize the limitations on the data results due to, among other things,
off-docket activity and certain information not being available for all cases on the dockets.
Nevertheless, the authors have scrutinized the data and believe that it provides not only useful
information for courts, policymakers, and practitioners, but that it also supports some of the
anecdotal evidence discussed in this Article. The authors do not, however, assert that the
findings prove or disprove any observations.
198. See supra Part IV.C.3.
199. See supra Part IV.C.4.
200. See supra Part IV.C.3.

2b. Harner_Marincic_Page.doc

2011]

4/27/2011 11:46 AM

COMMITTEE CAPTURE?

795

evaluate further the roles of committees, particularly in the context of
Chapter 11 liquidations.
2. Hypothesis No. 2: Conflicts and Self-Dealing Impact Value
This hypothesis asserts that the presence or absence of conflict
or self-interest in the composition of creditors‘ committees impacts
value in Chapter 11 cases, as determined by returns to unsecured
creditors and company reorganizations. As discussed in Part IV.D, the
data suggest that potential conflicts of interest of individual
committee members do not affect either the debtor‘s reorganization
efforts or general unsecured creditors‘ percentage recoveries.201 The
same finding emerged for litigation instituted by the creditors‘
committee against secured creditors and debtors.202 As such, the data
tend to support rejecting the hypothesis.
As discussed in Part V, these findings do not necessarily mean
that the identity of committee members or their conduct is irrelevant
to the analysis. Rather, they encourage a more meaningful evaluation
of the committee structure and the nature of disclosures in Chapter
11. If the presence of a creditors‘ committee may increase the
likelihood of liquidation, as suggested in Part IV.C, the analysis needs
to focus on factors other than known conflicts and disputes. Part V
examines potential contributing factors and proposes some solutions
to mitigate any value impact.
V. REFLECTIONS ON DATA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
CHAPTER 11 POLICY
Creditors need representation in the Chapter 11 process. The
Bankruptcy Code facilitates this representation through creditors‘
committees.203 Those committees are not used in every case, however,
and may encourage more liquidations and lower distributions to
general unsecured creditors.204 The latter finding is somewhat
counterintuitive and deserves further analysis. This Part dissects
what is known about creditors‘ committees from Part IV, additional
data in the study, and anecdotal evidence, and it proposes that
explanations may lie in the composition of the committee and the
circumstances of the particular cases.

201.
202.
203.
204.

See supra Part IV.D.3.
See supra Part IV.D.3.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra Parts IV.B, IV.C.3–4.
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A. Creditors’ Committees and Liquidation
Chapter 11 cases involving either a sale of substantially all of
the debtor‘s assets or liquidation typically reach resolution quicker
than reorganizations.205 The data also suggest that most creditors
receive lower distributions in liquidations than in reorganizations.206
Nevertheless, from a creditor‘s perspective, the prospect of quicker
resolution may outweigh a potential increase in recovery.
It is difficult to discern creditor preferences from Chapter 11
dockets, but the data offer important clues. For example, many
creditors‘ committees include financial institutions—indenture
trustees,
bondholders,
and
unsecured
lenders—in
their
membership.207 Financial institutions often hold large unsecured
claims against the debtor, have the resources to participate in the
Chapter 11 case, and qualify to serve on the creditors‘ committee. In
many cases, these parties can lend expertise and context to committee
deliberations and decisions. They may also hold a different perspective
than other committee members, however, on the debtor‘s
reorganization options.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that financial institutions no
longer engage in relationship lending and often prefer a quick
liquidation of a troubled credit.208 These tendencies may be enhanced
if the financial institution is a hedge fund or the institution‘s
proprietary trading division, which typically possess short-term

205. The predicted durations for cases involving liquidation plans or sales and
reorganization plans are 131 days and 196 days, respectively. There are significant differences in
duration such that cases with a liquidation plan or sale resolve more quickly than do cases that
reorganize (p = .002). This pattern is not observed in the District of Delaware where the average
duration for reorganizing cases is 113 days and the average duration for liquidating cases is 150
days.
206. In comparing cases involving plans of reorganization against those involving plans of
liquidation or sale motions, creditors received more than 50% in 56.7% of the reorganization
cases and 27.8% of the liquidation cases. The difference is significant (p = .001). The same result
emerges if the comparison is limited solely to plans of reorganization versus plans of liquidation
(p = .002).
207. In the case database, 143 cases involve at least one creditors‘ committee. All 143 cases
have information about whether or not financial member served on the creditors‘ committee. Of
these cases, 59 (41.3%) had at least one financial institution on the creditors‘ committee while
the remaining 84 (58.7%) did not. Moreover, of the 143 cases, 76 (53.1%) resulted in liquidation
(or sale motion), 54 (37.8%) resulted in reorganization, and 13 (9.1%) had some other resolution.
208. See, e.g., Harner, supra note 48, at 110–11 (discussing increased syndication and
selling of loan positions and breakdown in relationship lending); see also Frederick Tung,
Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance,
57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 117 (2009) (exploring the dynamics of lending relationships in corporate
governance).
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investment horizons.209 Moreover, short-term investors may have
hedged their claims against the debtor, thereby limiting their
financial exposure, or they may have purchased their claims at a
significant discount.210 These and other similar preferences do not
necessarily represent conflicts of interest and may not be discernible
from the docket, but they certainly may affect how those members
influence and vote on committee decisions.
Interestingly, the data indicate that cases with at least one
financial institution serving on the creditors‘ committee at some point
during the case were significantly more likely to result in
reorganization (as opposed to liquidation) than were cases with no
financial institution members.211 This result could support several
alternative, and meaningful, inferences. For example, financial
institutions could be seeking positions on the committee to facilitate a
debt-for-equity exchange and ownership in the reorganized
company.212 Alternatively, the presence of a different voice—for
example, a financial institution rather than all trade creditors—may
generate more thorough discussions regarding the debtor‘s
restructuring alternatives.213 Moreover, creditors‘ committees may
benefit from the expertise of financial institution members in their
review of proposals by, and discussions with, the debtor. This result
remained even after controlling for factors such as asset size, number

209. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study
of Investors’ Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 102–03 (2008) (setting forth empirical
data regarding creditors‘ investment horizons and objectives).
210. See, e.g, Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609,
1662 (2008) (explaining investment and hedging strategies of hedge funds and similar investors
in Chapter 11 process); Robert K. Rasmussen, Where Are All the Transnational Bankruptcies?
The Puzzling Case for Universalism, 32 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 983, 1001–02 (2007) (discussing
involvement and objectives of hedge funds and similar investors in Chapter 11 process).
211. Of the 130 cases with a creditors‘ committee that result in either liquidation or
reorganization, 76 (58.5%) result in liquidation (including sale motion) and 54 (41.5%) result in
reorganization. Furthermore, of these 130 cases, 56 (43.1%) have at least one financial member
on the creditors‘ committee and 74 (56.9%) do not. The predicted probabilities that a case with at
least one financial member and a case with no financial members will liquidate are .446 and
.689, respectively. There is a significant effect of whether or not a financial member is on the
creditors‘ committee such that cases not involving a financial member are significantly more
likely than cases involving a financial member to liquidate (including sale motions) than to
reorganize (p = .005). This pattern is observed in all forums. The presence of a financial
institution on a creditors‘ committee did not significantly affect percentage recoveries to general
unsecured creditors.
212. See Harner, supra note 209, at 82–87 (reporting results of a survey showing that
certain investors target the debt of troubled companies to facilitate a debt-for-equity exchange or
otherwise acquire equity interests in the company).
213. See infra Part V.B.
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of creditors, presence of secured debt, and approval of DIP
financing.214
Committee member turnover also may allow one or more
longer-term members (whether or not financial institutions) to assert
more influence over the process. One or more committee members
resigned or were removed from creditors‘ committees in twenty-five
percent of database cases involving creditors‘ committees.215
Accordingly, instability in committee composition may contribute to
certain member preferences having more sway in any given case.
In addition, there are potentially relevant differences between
UCC cases, which tend to liquidate more frequently, and NC and OC
cases, which tend to reorganize.216 For example, NC cases generally
involve a small number of creditors and limited assets and, as a result,
increased owner/management control over the outcome.217 Owners and
managers will pursue reorganization to, among other things, salvage
their investment in and employment with the debtor. NC cases also
may arise in the prepackaged or pre-arranged plan context where
quick implementation of a plan of reorganization typically is the
primary goal.218
Likewise, as discussed in Part IV.C, OC cases tend to involve a
greater number of claims asserted against a larger pool of assets, with
more creditors‘ interests represented in the process.219 The first
attribute suggests that there may be more value to distribute and
realize through reorganization. The second attribute suggests that
more checks exist on debtor, secured creditor, and creditors‘ committee
conduct. Consequently, it may be more difficult for any one creditor to
influence the outcome of the Chapter 11 case.
Finally, in some cases, a debtor‘s liquidation may be inevitable
and beyond the control of any party.220 Some companies that file for
214. Of the 130 cases with a creditors‘ committee that result in either liquidation or
reorganization, 128 cases include information about asset size, number of creditors, DIP
financing, and secured claims. Controlling for these covariates, cases with at least one financial
member are still significantly less likely to result in liquidation than are cases with no financial
member (p = .019).
215. See also supra notes 5–24 and accompanying text (discussing the FiberMark case).
216. See supra Part IV.C.3.
217. See infra Appendix B.
218. Twenty cases involved prepackage or pre-arranged plans. Eight (40%) were NC, 4
(20%) were UCC, and 8 (40%) were OC.
219. See supra Part IV.C.4.
220. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, The Economic Analysis of Corporate
Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 89–90 (1995) (discussing the challenges in
determining economic viability); Michelle J. White, Does Chapter 11 Save Economically
Inefficient Firms?, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1319, 1319–21 (1994) (discussing corporate liquidation in
Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11 and the challenges in determining economic viability).
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Chapter 11 have outlived their economic utility and the process simply
provides an organized means for distributing any remaining value to
stakeholders.
B. Proposals for Mitigating Potential Undue Influence
As discussed above, the data are reason for thoughtful
consideration. The data do not reflect certain information, and there is
some truth to the proposition that every case is different.
Nevertheless, strengthening the committee structure based on the
information gleaned from the data will only improve the overall
process.
Based on the data, Chapter 11 participants may benefit from
an increased focus on committee composition, use of multiple
committees, and increased public disclosures. The primary advantages
of multiple committees are that they minimize potential conflicts and
adverse perspectives within a single committee and enhance oversight
of other parties in the process.221 The primary disadvantage, of course,
is the increase in administrative expenses incurred and paid by the
debtor‘s estate.222 The challenge then is to determine when, and to
what extent, the potential advantages to multiple committees
outweigh the cost disadvantage.
There probably is no one set of circumstances warranting
multiple committee appointments—the determination should be made
on a case-by-case basis. The size of the case, diversity among
stakeholders, and level of stakeholder interest would be important
factors. The bankruptcy courts and the U.S. trustee also could develop
guidelines for multiple committee cases to maintain both procedural
and cost control in those cases. For example, the guidelines could
strongly encourage telephonic meetings and court appearances in
appropriate circumstances; restrict the number of committee
representatives who may participate in or appear at meetings and
hearings; require the committees to divide investigatory duties, where
appropriate, and share information on a confidential basis to minimize
duplication; and perhaps cap the committees‘ professional fees, with

221. As previously noted, the legislative history to section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code
suggests that Congress envisioned a multiple committee structure. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95–
595, at 235–36, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6195 (―[T]he bill also provides for
additional committees, with standing equal to that of the unsecured creditors‘ committee, when
such additional committees are needed to represent various other interests in the case.‖); supra
Part II.A.3.
222. See, e.g., Gwynne, supra note 180, at 134 (discussing costs associated with multiple
committees); Lubben, supra note 95 (analyzing factors leading to increased cost of bankruptcies).
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the potential for increases if certain percentage recoveries are
achieved for the committee‘s beneficiaries. A structured multiplecommittee process may mitigate the downside to the formation and
active participation of multiple committees.
In addition, in single-committee cases, the U.S. trustee should
continue to focus on adequate representation of the general unsecured
creditor body.223 In making the adequate representation
determination, however, creditors may benefit from a categorical
representation approach. If a debtor‘s unsecured creditors include
bondholders, suppliers, landlords, and employees, the creditors‘
committee should have one representative for each category of
claims—that is, one bondholder or indenture trustee, one supplier, one
landlord, and one employee. The U.S. trustee also could identify an
alternate for each category so that, when a member resigns, a creditor
from the same category can be easily identified and appointed to the
committee.
This categorical approach is designed to mimic the effects of
multiple committee cases on a smaller scale. A committee focused on
equal representation among types of claims (and not concerned with
claim amounts) likely would be more representative of the various
perspectives held by the general unsecured creditor body than a
committee comprising solely of the largest claimholders. A single
committee also should impose lower administrative costs on the estate
than the multiple committee structure. Nevertheless, it may be
difficult to find creditors in each category who are willing to serve on

223. Under the guidance of section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code, the U.S. trustee generally
selects committee members based on the amount of creditors‘ unsecured claims against the
debtor. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (2006) (―A committee of creditors appointed under
subsection (a) of this section shall ordinarily consist of the persons, willing to serve, that hold the
seven largest claims against the debtor of the kinds represented on such committee.‖). For
example, consider the following Q&A provided by one of the offices of the U.S. trustee:
Q: How are creditors appointed to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors?
A: In most cases, the United States Trustee solicits the interest of the Twenty Largest
Unsecured Creditors by mailing the creditors a Committee Acceptance Form. If there
are sufficient responses to the solicitation, the United States Trustee will form an
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. In selected cases, the United States
Trustee conducts an Organizational Meeting where the presence of the creditor or the
creditor‘s authorized representative (bearing a written authorization) is required. The
United States Trustee forms a Committee by appointing creditors in attendance (in
person or by proxy) at the Organizational Meeting.
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. TRUSTEE PROGRAM, REGION 2, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, (Jan. 8,
2010), http://www.justice.gov/ust/r02/manhattan/faqs.htm#CH11Q2. If further study and
consideration support a categorical approach to single committee composition, an amendment to
the language of section 1102(b) likely will help facilitate a more uniform implementation of that
approach.
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the committee.224 As discussed above, incentive to serve is an existing
problem and may warrant further study.225
Creating representative committees that are effective in a
Chapter 11 case requires not only the right parties but also additional
information. The bankruptcy courts and the U.S. trustee can make
informed decisions about the number and composition of committees
only if they have all of the relevant information from the debtor and
creditors. As such, debtors who do not file their schedules of assets
and liabilities in a timely manner will need to submit at least basic
information on the categories of their general unsecured claims and
parties potentially holding those claims.226 Moreover, creditors
interested in serving on the committee need to make full disclosures
regarding their claims against and interests in the debtor, its affiliates
and insiders, and its competitors.
Notably, these types of basic disclosures should be required of
any party actively participating in the Chapter 11 case—a sort of ―say
to play‖ rule. If a creditor or other party objects to the debtor‘s plan,
submits a bid to purchase the debtor‘s assets, or otherwise seeks to be
heard in the Chapter 11 case, the parties, including the bankruptcy
court, need to know this information.227 Although parties typically will
say that they are creditors or hold a claim of a certain amount to
establish standing under section 1109 of the Bankruptcy Code, they
rarely provide the details of their full interest in the Chapter 11

224. The decision to serve on a committee typically is a cost-benefit analysis for a creditor.
Accordingly, a small trade creditor may not find it efficient to serve, even if it is one of the few
trade creditors available to represent that category of claims on the committee. Accordingly, after
further study of the benefits to multiple committees or categorical single committees, it may
prove advantageous and economically efficient to provide small economic incentives to creditors
who serve on committees.
225. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing challenges to active committee
participation).
226. Rule 1007(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure require debtors to file
their schedules of assets and liabilities on the first day of the Chapter 11 case, with the
bankruptcy petition. Many debtors do not follow this mandate, however, and often receive
extensions of their deadline to file schedules pursuant to Rule 1007(a)(5). FED. R. BANKR. P.
1007(a).
227. As discussed supra note 185, disclosure issues for lawyers representing more than one
creditor or shareholder often arise under Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure. An amendment to Rule 2019 is under consideration that would ―expand the scope of
its coverage and the content of its disclosure requirements.‖ Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules Call for More Creditor Disclosure, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2010, at 10, 11 (setting forth
language of proposed amendment). These amendments would not, however, apply to creditors or
shareholders represented by separate lawyers, and certain of the suggested revisions (for
example, the amount paid by the party for its claim or interest) may not be warranted.
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case.228 To the extent such disclosures might reveal confidential or
allegedly proprietary information, the bankruptcy court is well suited
to grant exceptions for cause or order other appropriate protections for
the parties.
C. Policy Considerations in Mitigating Undue Influence
Chapter 11 is designed to pool a debtor‘s resources and level
the playing field among creditors.229 The automatic stay prevents
individual creditors from dismantling the debtor piecemeal and
provides the debtor an opportunity to catch its financial breath.230 The
process attempts to create an environment conducive to cooperation
and value maximization. The committee structure should enhance this
process.
Retooling the committee structure to embrace multiple
committees when warranted and adopting a categorical approach to
single committee composition would be a good first step. More
balanced creditor representation will give a stronger voice to various
creditor perspectives and mitigate the potential for undue influence by
individual creditors. Requiring additional disclosures by parties
participating on committees or in the case more generally will serve
this same goal. More participation by better informed parties also
aligns with the original purposes of section 1102 of the Bankruptcy
Code.231
CONCLUSION
Congress envisioned an active and productive role for creditors‘
committees in Chapter 11 cases. Creditors‘ committees offer a
potential solution to the collective action problem and a statutory
monitor of the debtor‘s activities. The data suggest, however, that
creditors‘ committees are not reaching their full potential and may be
contributing to liquidations and lower creditor recoveries.232
Does the data support discarding the committee structure? Not
necessarily. A more constructive approach is to use the data to

228. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2006) (―A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a
creditors‘ committee, an equity security holders‘ committee, a creditor, an equity security holder,
or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under
this chapter.‖).
229. See supra Part II.A.
230. § 362 (describing the scope and content of bankruptcy automatic stay).
231. See supra Part II.A.3.
232. See supra Part IV.

2b. Harner_Marincic_Page.doc

2011]

4/27/2011 11:46 AM

COMMITTEE CAPTURE?

803

strengthen the committee structure—going back to a role where
committees ―represent the various classes of creditors and equity
security holders from which they are selected. . . . [and] protect their
constituents‘ interests.‖233 The proposed use of multiple committees,
categorical single committees, and more robust disclosures targets
that goal.234 By striving to give more creditors a stronger, more
informed voice on committees, the committee structure could help
protect the process from the often subtle and questionable influence of
just a few.

233. H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 235, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6194.
234. See supra Part V.B.
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APPENDIX A
Components of Database:
Step One:
For each jurisdiction, the authors ran a ―Case Report‖ through
PACER for each of the years implicated by the study. The Case Report
listed only Chapter 11 cases filed in the jurisdiction during the
applicable study period. Step One resulted in twenty-seven different
Case Reports.
Step Two:
The authors then eliminated the following types of cases from
each of the Case Reports:
 Individual cases
 Cases dismissed or converted within the first twelve months of
the filing date
 Cases of affiliated or related debtors in jointly-administered
cases
The following table shows the total number of cases in each
Case Report following the review and elimination process of Step Two:
Year

SDNY

DE

NDIL

2002235

170

75

76

321

2003

147

61

47

255

2004

116

27

40

2005

109

27

39

2006

72

31

27

2007

62

36

34

2008

115

82

46

Total

791

339

309

128

62

45

1674

%

47.3

20.3

18.5

7.6

3.7

2.7

100.11

1Total

CDCA

66

MD

29

NDOH

24

Total

302
175
130

62

33

21

248
243

percentage does not sum to 100 due to rounding.

235. The case database includes one case filed in 2001. This case was the lead case in the
Chapter 11 cases of the lead debtor and its affiliates. One of the affiliate debtors filed its case in
2002 and was selected for the database through the stratified random selection process.
Consistent with the study‘s methodology, the lead case was substituted for the eliminated
affiliate case. The authors considered replacing this case but elected to retain it for consistency
purposes and because it was filed only five months before the study period.
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Step Three:
The Bureau then randomly selected ten cases from each Case
Report. This process yielded a total database of 270 cases.
Step Four:
The authors then used the LoPucki Business Bankruptcy
Project database (―BBP‖) to identify all cases included in the BBP that
were filed in a jurisdiction and year implicated by the study. This
process yielded 146 cases, from which the Bureau randomly selected
twenty-six cases that were not already included in the 270 cases
identified in Step Three.
Step Five:
The authors and the Bureau selected a total of 296 cases for
the database. The Bureau then assigned each case a token number
and randomly allocated the cases among the four coders.
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APPENDIX B
Specific Case Information236
Jurisdiction

NC
(n=144)

UCC
(n=115)

OC
(n=37)

Total

11
12.6
7.6

58
66.7
50.4

18
20.7
48.6

87
100.0
29.4

52
72.2
36.1

15
20.8
13.0

5
6.9
13.5

72
100.0
24.3

41
54.7
28.5

21
28.0
18.3

13
17.3
35.1

75
100.0
25.3

13
65.0
9.0

7
35.0
6.1

—
—
—

20
100.0
6.8

14
70.0
9.7

5
25.0
4.3

1
5.0
2.7

20
100.0
6.8

12
60.0
8.3

8
40.0
7.0

—
—
—

20
100.0
6.8

1
50.0
0.7

1
50.0
0.9

—
—
—

2
100.0
0.7

District of Delaware
Count
% within Jurisdiction
% within Committee Type
Northern District of Illinois
Count
% within Jurisdiction
% within Committee Type
Southern District of New York
Count
% within Jurisdiction
% within Committee Type
District of Maryland
Count
% within Jurisdiction
% within Committee Type
Central District of California
Count
% within Jurisdiction
% within Committee Type
Northern District of Ohio
Count
% within Jurisdiction
% within Committee Type
Southern District of New York,
but then transferred to another
jurisdiction
Count
% within Jurisdiction
% within Committee Type

236. Unless noted otherwise, all reported percentages reflect the percentage observed within
a committee type.
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Form of Business Entity237
Corporation
Partnership
Limited Partnership (or LLP)
Limited Liability Company
Public Company
Small Business Debtor238
Single Asset Real Estate
Debtor239

807

NC
(n=144)
117
(82.4)
2
(1.4)
2
(1.4)
21
(14.8)
17
(11.8)
42
(29.2)
20
(13.9)

UCC
(n=115)
104
(90.4)
1
(0.9)
1
(0.9)
9
(7.8)
35
(30.4)
5
(4.3)
1
(0.9)

OC
(n=37)
32
(88.9)
1
(2.8)
—
—
3
(8.3)
22
(59.5)
1
(2.7)
1
(2.7)

1
(0.7)

1
(0.9)

—

2
(0.7)

3
(2.6)
34
(29.6)

1
(2.7)
1
(2.7)
12
(32.4)

2
(0.7)
10
(3.4)
57
(19.3)

Total
253
(85.3)
4
(1.4)
3
(1.0)
33
(11.3)
74
(25.0)
48
(16.2)
22
(7.4)

Debtor’s Industry
Agriculture, Forestry,
and Fishing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing

1
(0.7)
6
(4.2)
11
(7.6)

—

Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary
Services

15
(10.4)

15
(13.0)

8
(21.6)

38
(12.8)

Wholesale or Retail Trade

13
(9.0)

27
(23.5)

2
5.4)

42
(14.2)

Finance, Insurance, and
Real Estate

36
(25.0)

9
(7.8)

6
(16.2)

51
(17.2)

60
(41.7)
1
(0.7)

20
(17.4)
6
(5.2)

6
(16.2)
1
(2.7)

86
(29.1)
8
(2.7)

Services
Unknown

237. Some cases had unknown classifications. NC: 1.4% (n = 2), OC: 2.7% (n = 1).
238. Some cases had unknown classifications. NC: 2.1% (n = 3), UCC: 2.6% (n = 3).
239. Some cases had unknown classifications. NC: 2.8% (n = 4), UCC: 0.9% (n = 1).
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NC
(n=144)

UCC
(n=115)

OC
(n=37)

96
(66.7)
26
(18.1)
9
(6.3)
7
(4.9)
2
(1.4)
4
(2.8)

26
(22.6)
10
(8.7)
17
(14.8)
28
(24.3)
33
(28.7)
1
(0.9)

9
(24.3)

Mean

37,216,000

57,676,000

7,305,000,000

903,250,000

Median

956,783

7,424,100

366,320,000

2,508,000

Mean

47,858,000

107,560,000

1,552,500,000

248,910,000

Median

1,791,800

22,206,000

580,240,000

6,156,700

Mean

24,500,000

115,970,000

1,013,700,000

177,170,000

Median

503,578

7,105,600

6,427,900

1,040,300

Affiliated Creditors
1–49
50–99
100–199
200–999
1,000 or more
Unknown

—
2
(5.4)
3
(8.1)
33
(62.2)
—

Total
131
(44.3)
36
(12.2)
28
(9.5)
38
(12.8)
58
(19.6)
5
(1.7)

Total Assets (in
dollars)

Total Liabilities
(in dollars)

Gross Annual Income
(last full preceding
chapter 11 petition)
(in dollars)
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APPENDIX C
Table 1: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for
Effect of Committee Type on Percentage Recovery (N = 162)
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE B

Exp(B)

B

SE B

Exp(B)

Constant

-1.12***

0.31

0.33

-1.69**

0.52

0.19

NC

1.04**

0.39

2.84

1.51**

0.51

4.54

OC

1.97***

0.50

7.17

1.82**

0.53

6.15

Assets (≥ median)

1.14**

0.48

3.14

DIP Financing
(approved)

-0.51

0.39

0.60

UCC (reference)

Nagelkerke R2
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

.14

.20
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Table 2: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for
Effect of Committee Type on Liquidation (N = 189)
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE B

Exp(B)

B

SE B

Exp(B)

Constant

0.52**

0.24

1.68

0.55

0.42

1.73

NC

-1.34***

0.34

0.26

-1.44***

0.41

0.24

OC

-2.20***

0.54

0.11

-2.37***

0.57

0.09

Assets (≥ median)

0.88**

0.38

2.41

DIP Financing
(approved)

-1.10**

0.39

0.36

UCC (reference)

Nagelkerke R2
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

.19

.26

